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Debt Intolerance
In this paper we argue that history matters: that a country’s record at
meeting its debt obligations and managing its macroeconomy in the past
is relevant to forecasting its ability to sustain moderate to high levels of
indebtedness, both domestic and internal, for many years into the future.
We introduce the concept of “debt intolerance” (drawing an analogy to,
for example, “lactose intolerance”), which manifests itself in the extreme
duress many emerging market economies experience at overall debt lev-
els that would seem quite manageable by the standards of the advanced
industrial economies. For external debt, “safe” thresholds for highly debt-
intolerant emerging markets appear to be surprisingly low, perhaps as low
as 15 to 20 percent of GNP in many cases, and these thresholds depend
heavily on the country’s record of default and inﬂation. Debt intolerance
is indeed intimately linked to the pervasive phenomenon of serial default
that has plagued so many countries over the past two centuries. Debt-
intolerant countries tend to have weak ﬁscal structures and weak ﬁnancial
systems. Default often exacerbates these problems, making these same
countries more prone to future default. Understanding and measuring debt
intolerance is fundamental to assessing the problems of debt sustainabil-
ity, debt restructuring, and capital market integration, and to assessing the
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1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:10  Page 1Certainly, the idea that factors such as sound institutions and a history
of good economic management affect the interest rate at which a country
can borrow is well developed in the theoretical literature. Also well estab-
lished is the notion that, as its external debt rises, a country becomes more
vulnerable to being suddenly shut out of international capital markets,
that is, to suffer a debt crisis.1 However, there has to date been no attempt
to make these abstract theories operational by identifying the factors (in
particular, a history of serial default or restructuring) that govern how
quickly a country becomes vulnerable to a debt crisis as its external obli-
gations accumulate. One goal of this paper is to quantify this debt intoler-
ance, drawing on a history of adverse credit events going back to the
1820s. We argue that a country’s current level of debt intolerance can be
approximated empirically as the ratio of the long-term average of its
external debt (scaled by GNP or exports) to an index of default risk. We
recognize that other factors, such as the degree of dollarization, indexa-
tion to inﬂation or short-term interest rates, and the maturity structure of a
country’s debt, are also relevant to assessing a country’s vulnerability to
symptoms of debt intolerance.2 We argue, however, that in general these
factors are different manifestations of the same underlying institutional
weaknesses. Indeed, unless these weaknesses are addressed, the notion
that the “original sin” of serial defaulters can be extinguished through
some stroke of ﬁnancial engineering, allowing these countries to borrow
in the same amounts, relative to GNP, as more advanced economies,
much less at the same interest rates, is sheer folly.3
The ﬁrst section of the paper gives a brief overview of the history of
serial default on external debt, showing that it is a remarkably pervasive
and enduring phenomenon: the European countries set benchmarks, cen-
turies ago, that today’s emerging markets have yet to surpass. For exam-
ple, Spain defaulted on its external debt thirteen times between 1500 and
1900, whereas Venezuela, the recordholder in our sample for the period
since 1824, has defaulted “only” nine times. We go on to show how coun-
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
1. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 6).
2. See Goldstein (2003) for a comprehensive discussion of these factors.
3. Some analysts, such as Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002), have put the
blame for recurring debt cycles on the incompleteness of international capital markets and
have proposed mechanisms to make it easier for emerging market economies to borrow
more. Needless to say, our view is that the main problem for these countries is how to bor-
row less. For another critical discussion of the notion of original sin, argued on different
grounds, see Reinhart and Reinhart (2003).
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less debt-intolerant “regions,” depending on their credit and inﬂation his-
tory. We also develop ﬁrst broad-brush measures of safe debt thresholds.
The data overwhelmingly suggest that the thresholds for emerging market
economies with high debt intolerance are much lower than those for
advanced industrial economies or for those emerging market economies
that have never defaulted on their external debt. Indeed, fully half of all
defaults or restructurings since 1970 took place in countries with ratios of
external debt to GNP below 60 percent.4
Our key ﬁnding, presented in the second section of the paper, is that a
country’s external debt intolerance can be explained by a very small num-
ber of variables related to its repayment history, indebtedness level, and
history of macroeconomic stability. Markets view highly debt-intolerant
countries as having an elevated risk of default, even at relatively low
ratios of debt to output or exports. Whether markets adequately price this
risk is an open question, but it is certainly a risk that the citizens of debt-
intolerant countries should be aware of when their leaders engage in
heavy borrowing.
The third section turns to the question of how debt intolerance affects
conventional calculations of debt sustainability, which typically assume
continual market access. For debt-intolerant countries, sustaining access
to capital markets can be problematic unless debt ratios are quickly
brought down to safer levels. To assess how such “deleveraging” might
be accomplished, we examine how, historically, emerging market
economies with substantial external debts have managed to work them
down. To our knowledge, this is a phenomenon that has previously
received very little, if any, attention. We analyze episodes of large debt
reversals, where countries’ external debt fell by more than 25 percentage
points of GNP over a three-year period. Of the twenty-two such reversals
that we identify for a broad group of middle-income countries since 1970,
two-thirds involved some form of default or restructuring. (Throughout
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4. See Sims (2001) for a model that implies that an economy with low taxation and low
indebtedness may optimally repudiate its debt, or inﬂate at high rates, more frequently than
an economy that has inherited high levels of taxation and debt (as have some industrial
economies). Indeed, as we shall see, and consistent with some of the predictions of that
model, the countries with the highest historical default probabilities, and the highest proba-
bility of inﬂation rates above 40 percent a year, also had (on average) much lower levels of
debt than the typical industrial economy.
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at terms that are tantamount to a partial default.) Only in one case—
Swaziland in 1985—was a country able to bring down a high ratio of
external debt to GNP solely as a result of rapid output growth.
Because history plays such a large role in our analysis, we focus pri-
marily on understanding emerging market economies’ access to external
capital markets. For most emerging markets, external borrowing has been
the only ﬁnancial game in town for much of the past two centuries, and
our debt thresholds are calculated accordingly. Over the past decade or so,
however, a number of emerging market economies have, for the ﬁrst time,
seen a rapid expansion in domestic, market-based debt, as we document
using an extensive new data set, which we present in the paper’s fourth
section. The calculus of domestic default obviously differs from that of
default on external debt, and we lack sufﬁcient historical data to investi-
gate the question fully. However, we argue that a record of external debt
intolerance is likely to be a good predictor of future domestic debt intoler-
ance. It is certainly the case that many of the major debt crises of the past
ten years have involved domestic debt, and that the countries that seem to
be experiencing domestic debt intolerance rank high on our debt intoler-
ance measures.5
Finally, if serial default is such a pervasive phenomenon, why do mar-
kets repeatedly lend to debt-intolerant countries to the point where the
risk of a credit event—a default or a restructuring—becomes signiﬁcant?
Part of the reason may have to do with the procyclical nature of capital
markets, which have repeatedly lent vast sums to emerging market
economies in boom periods (which are often associated with low returns
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
5. Some policymakers, of course, have come to recognize the problem at least since the
Mexican debt crisis of 1994. The academic literature has lagged behind, in part because of
lack of data, but also because the theoretical connections between external and domestic
debt have not been well articulated. Nonetheless, among the participants in this debate,
Ronald McKinnon merits special mention for anticipating the emergence of domestic gov-
ernment debt as a problem to be reckoned with. McKinnon wrote in 1991 that “One of the
most striking developments of the late 1980s was the extent to which the governments of
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil went into debt domestically. Because of the cumulative
effect of very high interest rates (over 30 percent real was not unusual) on their existing
domestic liabilities, government-debt-to-GNP ratios have been building up in an unsustain-
able fashion even though most of these countries are not paying much on their debts to
international banks. In many [developing countries], people now anticipate that govern-
ments will default on its own domestic bonds—as in March 1990 with the Brazilian gov-
ernment’s freeze of its own outstanding liabilities” (McKinnon, 1991, p. 6).
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producing painful “sudden stops.”6 As for the extent to which borrowing
countries themselves are complicit in the problem, one can only conclude
that, throughout history, governments have often been too short-sighted
(or too corrupt) to internalize the signiﬁcant risks that overborrowing pro-
duces over the longer term. Moreover, in the modern era, multilateral
institutions have been too complacent (or have had too little leverage)
when loans were pouring in. Thus a central conclusion of this paper is
that, for debt-intolerant countries, mechanisms to limit borrowing, either
through institutional change on the debtor side, or—in the case of external
borrowing—through changes in the legal or regulatory systems of credi-
tor countries, are probably desirable.7
Debt Intolerance: Origins and Implications for Borrowing
We begin by sketching the history of debt intolerance and serial
default, to show how this history importantly inﬂuences what “debtors’
club” a country belongs to.
Debt Intolerance and Serial Default in Historical Perspective
A bit of historical context will help to explain our approach, which
draws on a country’s long-term debt history. The basic point is that many
countries that have defaulted on their external debts have done so repeat-
edly, with remarkable similarities across the cycles. For example, many
of the Latin American countries that are experiencing severe debt prob-
lems today also experienced debt problems in the 1980s—and in the
1930s, and in the 1870s, and in the 1820s, and generally at other times as
well. Brazil, whose debt problems have attracted much attention lately,
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6. The procyclicality of capital ﬂows to developing countries has been amply docu-
mented, particularly since Carlos Díaz-Alejandro called attention to the phenomenon on
the eve of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s (Díaz-Alejandro, 1983, 1984). For a
recent and systematic review of the evidence on the procyclicality of capital ﬂows, see
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2003).
7. The need for institutional and legal changes to help rechannel capital ﬂows to devel-
oping countries from debt toward foreign direct investment, other forms of equity, and aid,
so as to prevent the recurrence of debt crises, is the central theme of Bulow and Rogoff
(1990).
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During that same period, Venezuela has defaulted nine times, as already
noted, and Argentina four times, not counting its most recent episode. But
the problem is by no means limited to Latin America. For example,
Turkey, which has been a center of attention of late, has defaulted six
times over the past 175 years. These same countries have at times also
defaulted, de facto, on their internal obligations, including through high
inﬂation or hyperinﬂation. On the other side of the ledger, a number of
countries have strikingly averted outright default, or restructuring that
reduced the present value of their debt, over the decades and centuries.
India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are members of this
honor roll. 
The contrast between the histories of the nondefaulters and those of the
serial defaulters, summarized in table 1, is stunning. Default can become
a way of life. Over the period from 1824 to 1999, the debts of Brazil and
Argentina were either in default or undergoing restructuring a quarter of
the time, those of Venezuela and Colombia almost 40 percent of the time,
and that of Mexico for almost half of all the years since its independence.
On average, the serial defaulters have had annual inﬂation exceeding
40 percent roughly a quarter of the time as well.8 By contrast, the emerg-
ing market economies in the table that have no external default history do
not count a single twelve-month period with inﬂation over 40 percent
among them. For future reference, the table also includes a sampling of
advanced economies with no modern history of external default.
Today’s emerging markets did not invent serial default. It has been
practiced in Europe since at least the sixteenth century, as table 2 illus-
trates. As already noted, Spain defaulted on its debt thirteen times from
the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, with the ﬁrst recorded
default in 1557 and the last in 1882. In the nineteenth century alone, Por-
tugal, Germany, and Austria defaulted on their external debts ﬁve times,
and Greece, with four defaults during that period, was not far behind.
France defaulted on its debt eight times between 1550 and 1800. (Admit-
tedly, the French governments’ debts were mainly held internally before
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
8. The list of serial defaulters in table 1 is far from complete. Russia’s 1998 default was
hardly the ﬁrst for that country (as table 2 shows, although the period covered does not
include the default on the tsarist debt after the 1917 revolution). Many other countries have
also defaulted on their external debts, including, recently, Indonesia and Ukraine in 1998,
Pakistan in 1999, and Ecuador in 2000.
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Table 1. Inﬂation, Default, and Risk of Default, Selected Countries, 1824–2001
Percent of  
12-month
periods Percent Institu-
with  No. of  of years No. of tional
inﬂation   default or in a state  years since Investor
≥ 40 restructuring of default or last year in rating,
percent, episodes, restructuring, default or September
Country 1958–2001a 1824–1999b 1824–1999b restructuring 2002c
Emerging market economies with at least one external default or restructuring since 1824
Argentina 47.2 4 25.6 0 15.8
Brazil 59.0 7 25.6 7 39.9
Chile 18.6 3 23.3 17 66.1
Colombia 0.8 7 38.6 57 38.7
Egypt 0.0 2 12.5 17 45.5
Mexico 16.7 8 46.9 12 59.0
Philippines 2.1 1 18.5 10 44.9
Turkey 57.8 6 16.5 20 33.8
Venezuela 11.6 9 38.6 4 30.6
Average 23.8 5.2 29.6 16 41.6
Emerging market economies with no external default history
India 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 47.3
Korea 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 65.6
Malaysia 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 57.7
Singapore 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 86.1
Thailand 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 51.9
Average 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 61.7
Industrial economies with no external default history
Australia 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 84.5
Canada 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 89.4
New Zealand 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 81.2
Norway 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 93.1
United  0.0 0 0.0 . . . 94.1
Kingdom
United States 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 93.1
Average 0.0 0 0.0 . . . 89.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Beim and Calomiris (2001); Standard & Poor’s Credit Week, various issues;
Institutional Investor, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
a. Period begins in 1962:1 for Singapore, 1964:1 for Brazil, 1966:1 for Thailand, 1970:1 for Turkey, and 1971:1 for Korea. 
b. Period begins in 1952 for Egypt and 1946 for the Philippines.
c. On a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 indicates the lowest probability of default on government debt.
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the creditors—giving new meaning to the term “capital punishment.”9)
This central fact—that some countries seem to default periodically,
and others never—both compels us to write on this topic and organizes
our thinking. True, as we will later illustrate, history is not everything.
Countries can eventually outgrow debt intolerance, but the process tends
to be exceedingly slow, and backsliding is extremely difﬁcult to avoid.
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
9. Episodes of saignée, or bloodletting, of ﬁnanciers took place a few years after each
of several of France’s defaults, including those of 1558, 1624, and 1661, when particularly
prominent creditors of the government were executed; see Bosher (1970) and Bouchard
(1891). The authors are grateful to Harold James for these references.
Table 2. Defaults on External Debt in Europe before the Twentieth Century 
1501–1800 1801–1900
No. of  No. of  Total 
Country defaults  Years of default defaults  Years of default  defaults
Spain 6 1557, 1575, 1596,  7 1820, 1831, 1834,  13
1607, 1627, 1647 1851, 1867, 1872,
1882
France 8 1558, 1624, 1648,  n.a. 8
1661, 1701, 1715, 
1770, 1788
Portugal 1 1560 5 1837, 1841, 1845,  6
1852, 1890
Germanya 1 1683 5 1807, 1812, 1813,  6
1814, 1850
Austria n.a. n.a. 5 1802, 1805, 1811,  5
1816, 1868
Greece n.a. n.a. 4 1826, 1843, 1860,  4
1893
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 2 1886, 1891 2
Holland n.a. n.a. 1 1814 1
Russia n.a. n.a. 1 1839 1
Total 16 30 46
Sources: Winkler (1933); Wynne (1951); Vives (1969); Bouchard (1891); Bosher (1970).
a. Defaults listed are those of Prussia in 1683, 1807, and 1813, Westphalia in 1812, Hesse in 1814, and Schleswig-Holstein in
1850.
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What does history tell us about the true costs of default? Might peri-
odic default (or, equivalently, restructuring) simply be a mechanism for
making debt more equity-like, that is, for effectively indexing a country’s
debt service to its output performance? After all, defaults typically occur
during economic downturns.10 Although there must be some truth to this
argument, our reading of history is that the deadweight costs to defaulting
on external debt can be signiﬁcant, particularly for a country’s trade,
investment ﬂows, and economic growth. In more advanced economies,
external default can often cause lasting damage to a country’s ﬁnancial
system, not least because of linkages between domestic and foreign ﬁnan-
cial markets. Indeed, although we do not investigate the issue here, we
conjecture that one of the reasons why countries without a default history
go to great lengths to avoid defaulting is precisely to protect their banking
and ﬁnancial systems. Conversely, weak ﬁnancial intermediation in many
serial defaulters lowers their penalty to default. The lower costs of ﬁnan-
cial disruption that these countries face may induce them to default at
lower thresholds, further weakening their ﬁnancial systems and perpetuat-
ing the cycle. One might make the same comment about tax systems, a
point to which we will return at the end of the paper. Countries where cap-
ital ﬂight and tax avoidance are high tend to have greater difﬁculty meet-
ing debt payments, forcing governments to seek more revenue from
relatively inelastic tax sources, in turn exacerbating ﬂight and avoidance.
Default ampliﬁes and ingrains this cycle.
We certainly do not want to overstate the costs of default or restructur-
ing, especially for serial defaulters. In fact, we will later show that debt-
intolerant countries rarely choose to grow or pay their way out of heavy
debt burdens without at least partial default. This revealed preference on
the part of debt-intolerant countries surely tells us something. Indeed,
many question whether, in the long run, the costs of allowing or precipi-
tating a default exceed the costs of an international bailout, at least for
some spectacular historical cases. But there is another side to the question
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10. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that one alternative, namely, formal output index-
ation clauses, although preferable to nonindexed debt, might be difﬁcult to verify or
enforce.
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has to do with the beneﬁt side of the equation. Our reading of the evi-
dence, at least from the 1980s and 1990s, is that external borrowing was
often driven by shortsighted governments that were willing to take signif-
icant risks to raise consumption temporarily, rather than to foster high-
return investment projects. The fact that the gains from borrowing come
quickly, whereas the increased risk of default is borne only in the future,
tilts shortsighted governments toward excessive debt. So, although the
costs of default are indeed often overstated, the beneﬁts to be reaped from
external borrowing are often overstated even more, especially if one looks
at the longer-term welfare of the citizens of debtor countries.
What does history tell us about the lenders? We do not need to tackle
this question here. Each of the periodic debt cycles the world has wit-
nessed has had its own unique character, either in the nature of the lender
(for example, bondholders in the 1930s and 1990s versus banks in the
1970s and 1980s) or in the nature of the domestic borrower (for example,
state-owned railroads in the 1870s versus core governments themselves in
the 1980s). There are, however, clearly established cycles in lending to
emerging markets, with money often pouring in when rates of return in
industrial countries are low. Heavy borrowers are particularly vulnerable
to “sudden stops” or reversals of capital ﬂows, when returns in industrial
countries once again pick up.
Debt Thresholds
Few macroeconomists would be surprised to learn that emerging mar-
ket economies with ratios of external debt to GNP above 150 percent run
a signiﬁcant risk of default. After all, among advanced economies,
Japan’s current debt-to-GDP ratio, at 120 percent, is almost universally
considered high. Yet default can and does occur at ratios of external debt
to GNP that would not be considered excessive for the typical advanced
economy: for example, Mexico’s 1982 debt crisis occurred at a ratio of
debt to GNP of 47 percent, and Argentina’s 2001 crisis at a ratio slightly
above 50 percent. 
We begin our investigation of the debt thresholds of emerging market
economies by chronicling all episodes of default or restructuring of exter-
nal debt among middle-income economies during the period from 1970 to
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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default or restructuring during that period, the ﬁrst year of each episode,
and the country’s ratios of external debt to GNP and to exports at the end
of the year in which the episode occurred. (Many episodes lasted several
years.) It is obvious from the table that Mexico’s 1982 default and
Argentina’s 2001 default were not exceptions: many other countries also
suffered adverse credit events at levels of debt below 50 percent of GNP.
Table 4 shows further that external debt exceeded 100 percent of GNP in
only 13 percent of these episodes, that more than half of these episodes
occurred at ratios of debt to GNP below 60 percent, and that defaults
occurred despite debt being less than 40 percent of GNP in 13 percent of
episodes.12 (Indeed, the external debt-to-GNP thresholds reported in table
3 are biased upward, because the debt-to-GNP ratios corresponding to the
year of the credit event are driven up by the real depreciation that typi-
cally accompanies the event.) 
We next compare the external indebtedness proﬁles of emerging mar-
ket economies with and without a history of default. The top panel of ﬁg-
ure 1 shows the frequency distribution of the external debt-to-GNP ratio,
and the bottom panel the external debt-to-exports ratio, for two groups of
countries over the period 1970–2000. The two distributions are very dis-
tinct and show that defaulters borrow more (even though their ratings tend
to be worse at a given level of debt) than nondefaulters. The gap in exter-
nal debt ratios between those emerging market economies with and those
without a history of default widens further when the ratio of external debt
to exports is considered. It appears that those countries that risk default
the most when they borrow (that is, those with the greatest debt intoler-
ance) also borrow the most—much as if a lactose-intolerant individual
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11. Following the World Bank, for some purposes we divide developing countries by
income per capita into two broad groups: middle-income countries (those developing coun-
tries with GNPs per capita higher than $755 in 1999) and low-income countries (those
below that level). Most but not all emerging market economies—deﬁned here as develop-
ing countries with substantial access to private external ﬁnancing—are middle-income
countries, and most but not all low-income countries have no access to private capital mar-
kets and instead rely primarily on ofﬁcial sources of external funding.
12. Tables 3 and 4 measure gross total external debt, as debtor governments have little
capacity to tax or otherwise conﬁscate private citizens’ assets held abroad. When Argentina
defaulted in 2001 on $140 billion of external debt, for example, the foreign assets held by
its citizens abroad were estimated by some commentators at about $120 billion to $150 bil-
lion. This phenomenon is not uncommon and indeed was the norm in the 1980s debt crisis.
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Table 3. External Debt Ratios in Middle-Income Countries at Time of Adverse
Credit Event, 1970–2001a
Percent
Initial year of  External debt-to-GNP   External debt-to-exports  
Country credit event ratio in initial year ratio in initial year
Albania 1990 45.8 616.3
Argentina 1982 55.1 447.3
2001 53.3 458.1
Bolivia 1980 92.5 246.4
Brazil 1983 50.1 393.6
Bulgaria 1990 57.1 154.0
Chile 1972 31.1 n.a.
1983 96.4 358.6
Costa Rica 1981 136.9 267.0
Dominican Rep. 1982 31.8 183.4
Ecuador 1982 60.1 281.8
1999 89.2 239.3
Egypt 1984 112.0 282.6
Guyana 1982 214.3 337.7
Honduras 1981 61.5 182.8
Iran 1992 42.5 77.7
Jamaica 1978 48.5 103.9
Jordan 1989 179.5 234.2
Mexico 1982 46.7 279.3
Morocco 1983 87.0 305.6
Panama 1983 88.1 56.9
Peru 1978 80.9 388.5
1984 62.0 288.9
Philippines 1983 70.6 278.1
Poland 1981 n.a. 108.1
Romania 1982 n.a. 73.1
Russia 1991 12.5 n.a.
1998 58.5 179.9
Trinidad and Tobago 1989 48.1 112.8
Turkey 1978 21.0 374.2
Uruguay 1983 63.7 204.0
Venezuela 1982 48.6 220.9
1995 44.1 147.2
Average 70.6 254.3
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance, various issues; Beim and Calomiris (2001); Standard & Poor’s Credit
Week, various issues.
a. A “credit event” is a default on or restructuring of the country’s external debt. Debt ratios are based on end-of-period debt
stocks. Credit events in Iraq in 1990, South Africa in 1985, and Yugoslavia in 1983 are excluded because debt ratios are
unavailable.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:10  Page 12were addicted to milk. It should be no surprise, then, that so many capital
ﬂow cycles end in an ugly credit event.
Figure 2 presents a subset of the numbers that underpin figure 1, as
well as the cumulative distribution of external debt-to-GNP ratios for
defaulters and nondefaulters. Over half of the countries with sound credit
histories have ratios of external debt to GNP below 35 percent (and
47 percent have ratios below 30 percent). By contrast, for those countries
with a relatively tarnished credit history, a threshold external debt-to-
GNP ratio above 40 percent is required to capture the majority of obser-
vations. We can see already from table 4 and figure 2, without taking into
account any country-specific factors that might explain debt intolerance,
that when external debt exceeds 30 to 35 percent of GNP in a debt-
intolerant country, the risk of a credit event starts to increase signifi-
cantly.13 We will later derive country-specific bounds that are much
stricter for debt-intolerant countries.
The Components of Debt Intolerance
To operationalize the measurement of debt intolerance, we focus on
two indicators: the sovereign debt ratings reported by Institutional
Investor, and the external debt-to-GNP ratio (or, alternatively, the exter-
nal debt-to-exports ratio). The Institutional Investor ratings (IIR), which
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13. Using an altogether different approach, an International Monetary Fund (2002)
study of debt sustainability arrived at external debt thresholds for developing countries
(excluding the heavily indebted poor countries) in the neighborhood of 31 to 39 percent,
depending on whether one includes ofﬁcial ﬁnancing in the indebtedness measure. The
results we present later suggest that country-speciﬁc thresholds for debt-intolerant coun-
tries should probably be much lower.
Table 4. Frequency Distribution of External Debt Ratios in Middle-Income
Countries at Time of Credit Event, 1970–2001a
External debt-to-GNP ratio in ﬁrst year of event Percent of all credit eventsb
Below 40 percent 13
41 to 60 percent 40
61 to 80 percent 13
81 to 100 percent 20
Above 100 percent 13
Sources: Table 3 and authors’ calculations.
a. Events for which debt ratios are not available are excluded from the calculations.
b. Frequencies do not sum to 100 because of rounding.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:10  Page 13Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of External Debt Ratios among Defaulting 
and Nondefaulting Emerging Market Economies, 1970–2000a
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, various issues, and World Bank, Global Development
Finance, various issues.
a. Sample consists of annual observations of nine defaulting and six nondefaulting emerging market economies. “Defaulting”
countries include those that underwent restructuring of their debt.
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Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of External Debt-to-GNP Ratios 
in Emerging Market Economies, 1970–2000
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1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 15are compiled twice a year, are based on information provided by econo-
mists and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and securities
ﬁrms. The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 to 100, with a rat-
ing of 100 given to those countries perceived as having the lowest chance
of defaulting on their government debt obligations.14 Hence we take the
transformed variable (100 – IIR) as a proxy for default risk. Market-based
measures of default risk are also available, but only for a much smaller
group of countries and over a much shorter sample period.15
The second major component of our debt intolerance measure is total
external debt, scaled either by GNP or by exports. We emphasize total
(public and private) external debt because most government debt in
emerging markets until the late 1980s was external, and because it often
happens that external debt that was private before a crisis becomes public
after the fact.16 (As we later show, however, in future analyses it will be
equally important to measure intolerance with reference to the growing
stock of domestic public debt.)
Figure 3 plots against each other the major components of debt intoler-
ance for each year in the period 1979–2000 for sixteen emerging market
economies. As expected, our preferred risk measure (100 – IIR) tends to
rise with the stock of external debt, but the relationship may be nonlinear.
In particular, when the risk measure is very high (concretely, when the
IIR falls below 30), it matters little whether the external debt-to-GNP
ratio is 80 percent or 160 percent, or whether the external debt-to-exports
ratio is 300 percent or 700 percent. This nonlinearity simply reﬂects the
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
14. For details of the survey see the September 2002 issue of Institutional Investor.
Although not critical to our analysis below, we interpret the ratings reported in each semi-
annual survey as capturing the near-term risk of default within one to two years.
15. Secondary market prices of external commercial bank debt, available since the
mid-1980s, provide a measure of expected repayment for a number of emerging market
countries. However, the Brady debt restructurings of the 1990s converted much of this
bank debt to bonds, so that from 1992 onward the secondary market prices would have to
be replaced by the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spread, which remains the most
commonly used measure of risk today. These market-based indicators introduce a serious
sample selection bias, however: almost all the countries in the EMBI, and all the countries
for which secondary-market price data from the 1980s are available, had a history of
adverse credit events, leaving the control group of nondefaulters as approximately the
null set.
16. See appendix A for brief deﬁnitions of the various concepts of debt used in this
paper.
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Figure 3. External Debt and Default Risk in Selected Emerging Market Economies,
1979–2000a
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance, various issues, and Institutional Investor, various issues.
a. The sixteen countries whose annual observations are depicted are those in the top two panels of table 1 except Singapore, plus
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1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 17fact that, below a certain threshold of the IIR, typically about 24, the
country has usually lost all access to private capital markets.17
Table 5 shows the period averages of various measures of risk and
external debt (the components of debt intolerance) for a representative
sample of countries, which we will refer to as our core sample (see appen-
dix B). Because some researchers have argued that the “right” benchmark
for emerging market indebtedness is the level of public debt that
advanced economies are able to sustain,18 table 5 also includes this mea-
sure for a group of nondefaulting advanced economies. The table makes
plain that, although the relationship between external debt and risk may
be monotonic for emerging market economies, it is clearly not monotonic
for the public debt of advanced economies; in those countries, relatively
high levels of government debt can coexist with low levels of risk.
Table 5, together with table 6, which shows the panel pairwise correla-
tions between the two debt ratios and three measures of risk for a larger
sample of developing economies, also highlights the fact that the different
measures of risk present a very similar picture both of countries’ relative
debt intolerance and of the correlation between risk and indebtedness. As
anticipated by ﬁgure 3, the correlations are uniformly positive in all
regional groupings and are usually statistically signiﬁcant. 
Debt Intolerance: Clubs and Regions
We next use our component measures of debt intolerance—IIR risk
ratings and external debt ratios—in a two-step algorithm, mapped in ﬁg-
ure 4, to deﬁne debtors’ clubs and vulnerability regions. We begin by cal-
culating the mean (45.9) and standard deviation (21.8) of the IIR for
ﬁfty-three developing and industrial countries over 1979–2002, and we
use these statistics to loosely group countries into three “clubs” (the coun-
tries and their period averages are listed in appendix table B1). Club A
includes those countries whose average IIR over the period 1979–2002 is
67.7 (the mean plus one standard deviation) or above; members of this
club—essentially, the advanced economies—enjoy virtually continuous
access to capital markets. As their repayment history and debt absorption
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
17. A similar picture emerges (for a smaller sample, not shown) when one uses other
measures of risk, such as secondary market prices of commercial bank debt or EMBI
spreads.
18. See, for example, Reisen (1989).
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 18capacity show (tables 1 and 3), these countries are the least debt intoler-
ant. At the opposite extreme, in club C, are those countries whose average
IIR is below 24.2 (the mean minus one standard deviation). This club
includes those countries that are so debt intolerant that markets give them
only sporadic opportunities to borrow; hence their primary sources of
Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano 19
Table 5. Indicators of Debt Intolerance, Selected Countriesa
Average      Average   Average
Average secondary Average external  external 
Institutional market EMBI debt- debt-
Investor price of spread  GNP ratio, exports ratio,
rating, debt, (basis 1970–2000 1970–2000
Country 1979–2002b 1986–92c points)d (percent) (percent)
Emerging market economies with at least one external default or restructuring since 1824
Argentina 34.7 31.0 1,756 37.1 368.8
Brazil 37.4 40.3 845 30.5 330.7
Chile 47.5 69.9 186 58.4 220.7
Colombia 44.6 70.0 649 33.6 193.5
Egypt 33.7 n.a. 442 70.6 226.7
Mexico 45.8 54.1 593 38.2 200.2
Philippines 34.7 54.1 464 55.2 200.3
Turkey 34.9 n.a. 663 31.5 210.1
Venezuela 41.5 57.2 1,021 41.3 145.9
Average 39.4 54.0 638 44.0 232.9
Emerging market economies with no external default history
India 46.5 n.a. n.a. 19.0 227.0
Korea 63.4 n.a. 236 31.9 85.7
Malaysia 63.5 n.a. 166 40.1 60.6
Singapore 79.9 n.a. n.a. 7.7 4.5
Thailand 55.7 n.a. 240 36.3 110.8
Average 61.8 n.a. 214 27.0 97.7
Industrial economies with no external default history
e
Australia 77.3 n.a. n.a. 29.8 159.3
Canada 86.0 n.a. n.a. 68.9 234.4
Italy 76.4 n.a. n.a. 81.6 366.0
New Zealand 70.7 n.a. n.a. 51.9 167.3
Norway 84.3 n.a. n.a. 34.4 87.5
United States 92.8 n.a. n.a. 58.4 671.7
Average 81.4 n.a. n.a. 54.2 281.0
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance, various issues; Institutional Investor, various issues; data from JP Mor-
gan Chase and Salomon Brothers; ANZ Bank, Secondary Market Price Report, various issues; OECD data.
a. Period averages.
b. Deﬁned as in table 1.
c. In cents on the dollar based on monthly averages. 
d. Difference between the current yield on the country’s traded external debt and the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds of compa-
rable maturity. Data are averages through 2002; the initial date varies by country as follows: Argentina, 1993; Brazil, Mexico,
and Venezuela, 1992; Chile, Colombia, and Turkey, 1999; Egypt and Malaysia, 2002; the Philippines and Thailand, 1997; Korea,
1998.
e. Debt ratios are based on total debt issued by the general government.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 19external  ﬁnancing are grants and ofﬁcial loans. Club B includes the
remaining countries and is the main focus of our analysis. These countries
exhibit varying degrees of debt intolerance.19 They occupy the “indeter-
minate” region of theoretical debt models, the region where default risk is
nontrivial, and where self-fulﬁlling debt runs may trigger a crisis. Club B
is large and includes both countries that are on the cusp of graduation to
club A as well as countries that may be on the brink of default. The mem-
bership of club B therefore requires further discrimination. Our preferred
creditworthiness measure, 100 – IIR, is no longer a sufﬁcient statistic, and
information on the extent of leveraging (the second component of debt
intolerance) is necessary to pin down more precisely the relative degree of
debt intolerance within this club.
Hence, in the second step, our algorithm further subdivides the “inde-
terminate” club B into four “regions,” ranging from least to most debt
intolerant. The region of least debt intolerance (which we call region I)
includes those countries whose average IIR over 1979–2002 was above
the mean and whose ratio of external debt to GNP was below 35 per-
cent. (As previously noted, countries below that threshold account for
20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
19. One is reminded of Groucho Marx’s aphorism, “I don’t care to belong to any club
that will have me as a member.” As will be shown, membership in club B is not a privilege.
Table 6. Pairwise Correlations between Alternative Measures of Risk 
and Debt by Developing Region
100 minus   100 minus secondary  
Institutional Investor market price of debt,
Region rating, 1979–2000 1986–92 EMBI spreada
Correlations with external debt-to-GNP ratio
Full sample 0.40* 0.47* 0.55*
Africa 0.22 0.65* 0.73*
Emerging Asia 0.44* n.a. n.a.
Middle East  0.18 n.a. n.a.
Western Hemisphere 0.38* 0.50* 0.45*
Correlations with external debt-to-exports ratio
Full sample 0.61* 0.58* 0.37*
Africa 0.60* 0.59* 0.67*
Emerging Asia 0.74* n.a. n.a.
Middle East  0.51* n.a. n.a.
Western Hemisphere 0.43* 0.59* 0.06
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance, various issues; Institutional Investor, various issues; data from JP Mor-
gan Chase and Salomon Brothers; ANZ Bank, Secondary Market Price Report, various issues.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
a. Deﬁned as in table 5; excludes Russia.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 21over half of the observations among nondefaulters over 1970–2001.)
Region II includes countries whose average IIR is above the mean but
whose external debt-to-GNP ratio is above 35 percent. Because their
higher-than-average long-run creditworthiness enables them to sustain a
higher-than-average debt burden, countries in this group are the second-
least debt-intolerant group. More debt intolerant still are the region III
countries, whose long-run creditworthiness (as measured by the average
IIR) is below the mean and whose external debt is below 35 percent of
GNP. Lastly, the countries with the highest debt intolerance are those in
region IV, with an average IIR below the mean and external debt levels
above 35 percent of GNP. Countries in region IV can easily fall into
club C, losing their market access to credit. For example, in early 2000
Argentina’s IIR was 43 and its external debt-to-GNP ratio was 51 percent,
making it a region IV country. As of September 2002, Argentina’s IIR
had dropped to 15.8, indicating that the country had backslid into club C.
As we will see, countries do not graduate to higher clubs easily; indeed, it
can take many decades of impeccable repayment performance and low
debt levels to graduate from club B to club A.
Debt Intolerance: The Role of History
We begin this section by offering some basic insights into the histori-
cal origins of country risk, which some have mislabeled “original sin.”20
In particular, we focus on countries’ credit and inﬂation histories. We
then use our core results for several purposes: to illustrate how to calcu-
late country-speciﬁc debt thresholds, in contrast to the coarse threshold
(an external debt-to-GNP ratio of 35 percent) derived earlier; to show
how countries in club B shift between debt intolerance regions over time;
to illustrate how countries may graduate into a better club; and to show
how a simple summary statistic can rank countries within club B accord-
ing to their relative degree of debt intolerance. 
Historical Determinants of Country Risk
To prepare to investigate econometrically the link between a country’s
external credit and inﬂation history, on the one hand, and its sovereign
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
20. See, for example, Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002).
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 22risk, on the other, we broaden our sample from the twenty countries listed
in table 5 to the ﬁfty-three industrial and developing economies listed in
appendix table B1. The IIR rating, our preferred measure of creditworthi-
ness, is the dependent variable in all the regressions. To measure a coun-
try’s credit history, we calculate the percentage of years in the sample
when the country was either in default on its external debt or undergoing
a restructuring of its debt. Two different periods are analyzed: 1824–1999
and 1946–1999. Another indicator of credit history we use is the number
of years since the country’s last default or restructuring on its external
debt. We also calculate for each country the percentage of twelve-month
periods during 1958–2000 when annual inﬂation was above 40 percent.21
Although it is quite reasonable to expect that debt intolerance may itself
lead to a higher probability of default (because markets charge a higher
premium on borrowing) or a higher probability of inﬂation (because often
the country has no other sources of deﬁcit ﬁnancing), we are not too con-
cerned about the potential endogeneity of these two regressors, because
they are largely predetermined relative to the main sample period, which
is 1979–2000.22
However, using 1970–2000 averages of the external debt-to-GNP ratio
(or the external debt-to-exports ratio) as a regressor does pose a potential
endogeneity problem. Therefore we report the results of both ordinary
least-squares and instrumental variable estimations, in the latter case
using the average debt-to-GNP ratio during 1970–78 as an instrument.
Because White’s test revealed heteroskedasticity in the residuals, we cor-
rect accordingly to ensure the consistency of the standard errors. To
investigate whether the differences in debt tolerance between countries in
club A and the rest of the sample are systematic, we also use a dummy
variable for club A in the regressions, allowing the club A countries to
have a different slope coefﬁcient on the debt-to-GNP ratio.
Table 7 presents the results of six different speciﬁcations of the cross-
country regressions. The results show that few variables sufﬁce to
account for a signiﬁcant portion (about 75 percent) of the cross-country
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21. For a discussion of why 40 percent seems a reasonable threshold for high inﬂation,
see Easterly (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
22. An obvious way of extending this analysis of credit history would be to distinguish
between peacetime and wartime defaults and gather additional information about govern-
ments’ violation of other contracts, such as defaults on domestic debt or forcible conver-
sions of dollar deposits into local currency (as occurred in Bolivia in 1982, Mexico in 1982,
Peru in 1985, and Argentina in 2002).
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 23variation in creditworthiness as measured by the IIR. As expected, a poor
track record on repayment or inﬂation lowers the rating and increases risk.
In the regressions, all but the debt-to-GNP coefﬁcients are constrained to
be the same for club A and all other countries. One common and robust
result across these regressions is that the external debt-to-GNP ratio enters
with a negative (and signiﬁcant) coefﬁcient for all the countries in clubs B
and C, whereas it has a positive coefﬁcient for the advanced economies in
club A.23 As we will show next, this result is robust to the addition of a
time dimension to the regressions. Although not reported here, these
results are equally robust to the use of the external debt-to-exports ratio in
lieu of the external debt-to-GNP ratio as a regressor.
We also performed two panel regressions (estimated with ﬁxed effects
and robust standard errors) in which the IIR was regressed against the
24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
23. The estimated coefﬁcient for the club A countries captures both institutional and
structural factors speciﬁc to those countries as well as the different concept of debt (total
public debt as opposed to total external debt) used for those cases (see appendix A).
Table 7. Regressions Explaining Institutional Investor Ratings with Inﬂation, 
Default Histories, and Debt Ratiosa
Least-squares Instrumental 
estimates variables estimates
Independent variable  7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6
Percent of 12-month periods  –0.16 –0.16 –0.11 –0.14 –0.13 –0.08
with inﬂation ≥ 40% (–2.97) (–1.87) (–1.37) (–1.93) (–1.26) (–0.65)
Percent of years in default or  –0.21 –0.12
restructuring since 1824 (–2.10) (–1.33)
Percent of years in default or  –0.17 –0.12
restructuring since 1946 (–1.53) (–0.86)
No. of years since last   0.05 0.05
default or restructuring (1.93) (1.91)
External debt-to-GNP  –0.33 –0.34 –0.29 –0.41 –0.39 –0.33
ratio × club B or C   (–5.40) (–4.49) (–4.03) (–3.52) (–2.51) (–2.02)
dummy variableb
Debt-to-GNP ratio  0.28 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.33
× club A dummy variableb (3.63) (3.68) (3.62) (2.12) (2.30) (2.23)
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.77
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data in Beim and Calomiris (2001); Institutional Investor, various issues; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; Standard & Poor’s Credit Week, various issues; Stan-
dard & Poor’s (1992).
a. The dependent variable is the 1979–2000 average of the country’s Institutional Investor rating. Numbers in parentheses are
t statistics. Estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The number of observations is 53.
b. Data for the external debt-to-GDP ratio are 1970–2000 averages. Clubs are as deﬁned in ﬁgure 4; appendix table B1 lists the
countries within each club.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 24external debt-to-GNP ratio and three dummy variables representing peri-
ods roughly corresponding to the phases of the most recent debt cycle.
The results are as follows: 
IIRit =α it – 3.01X1 – 12.22X2 – 7.01X3 – 0.13X4
(–2.06) (–8.98) (–5.13) (–10.37)
Adjusted R2 = 0.78; N = 769
IIRit =α it – 3.61X1 – 12.33X2 – 6.62X3 – 0.11X4 + 0.01X5
(–2.90) (–10.69) (–5.60) (–9.24) (0.04)
Adjusted R2 = 0.91; N = 1,030 (t statistics in parentheses).
In these regressions αit represents country-specific fixed effects (not
reported), X1 is a dummy variable for the period immediately before the
1980s debt crisis (1980–82), X2 is a dummy for the period during the cri-
sis and the Brady plan resolution (1983–93), X3 is a dummy for the
period after the crisis (1994–2000), X4 interacts the country’s external
debt-to-GNP ratio with a dummy variable for clubs B and C, and X5
interacts the debt-to-GNP ratio with a dummy for club A; i and t index
countries and years, respectively. Regressions including year-by-year
dummies (reported in appendix tables D1 to D4) reveal that the IIR data
naturally demarcate these three distinct subperiods. The first of the two
regressions above includes thirty-eight of the fifty-three countries in the
cross-sectional regressions (the countries in clubs B and C), whereas the
second regression also includes the fifteen countries in club A and (as
before) allows them to have a different slope coefficient on the debt-to-
GNP ratio, in addition to a different intercept.
The panel regressions (including those reported in the appendix) con-
ﬁrm a central ﬁnding of the cross-sectional regressions: debt is signiﬁ-
cantly and negatively related to perceived creditworthiness for the
debt-intolerant countries in clubs B and C. In contrast, in the regression
that includes the advanced economies, which make up most of club A, the
coefﬁcient on debt is positive—although, unlike in the cross-sectional
results, it is not statistically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients for the three sub-
periods are all statistically signiﬁcant, and their pattern has an intuitive
interpretation. Average IIRs were higher across the board before the debt
Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano 25
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unfolded, and they recovered only partially in the 1990s, never quite
reaching their precrisis levels. Thus debt intolerance is long lived.
Country-Speciﬁc Debt Thresholds
We now use some of our core results to illustrate that, although an
external debt-to-output ratio of 35 percent is a minimal debt “safety”
threshold for those countries that have not made it to club A, countries
with a weak credit history may become highly vulnerable even at much
lower levels of external debt. To illustrate this basic but critical point, we
perform the following exercise. We use the estimated coefﬁcients from
the ﬁrst regression in table 7, together with the actual values of the regres-
sors, to predict values of the IIR for varying ratios of external debt to GNP
for a given country. Table 8 illustrates the exercise for the cases of Argen-
tina and Malaysia for levels of external debt ranging from 0 to 45 percent
of GNP. Until Argentina’s default in December 2001, both countries were
members of club B.
The exercise shows clearly that Argentina’s precarious debt intoler-
ance situation is more severe than Malaysia’s. Argentina remains in the
relatively safe region I only as long as its external debt remains below
15 percent of GNP, whereas Malaysia remains in region I up to a debt-to-
GNP ratio of 35 percent, and it is still in the relatively safe region II with
a debt of 40 percent of GNP. These contrasting patterns can be seen
across a number of other cases (results not shown): Argentina is represen-
tative of the many countries with a relatively weak credit and inﬂation
history, whereas Malaysia is representative of countries with no history of
default or high inﬂation.
Moving between Debt Intolerance Regions
To illustrate how countries in club B can become more or less vulnera-
ble over time, table 9 presents an exercise similar to that in table 8 for the
case of Brazil. The main difference is that, this time, rather than using
hypothetical debt ratios, we estimate IIRs for Brazil using the country’s
actual external debt-to-GNP ratios for each year from 1979 to 2001. In
addition to these estimated IIRs, we report Brazil’s actual IIR in the same
year as well as the difference between the two. The last two columns
show the debt intolerance region within club B in which Brazil actually
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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ure 4) and the region in which it would have fallen based on its external
debt and the estimated IIR. The shaded area indicates the period when
Brazil’s external debt was in default or undergoing a restructuring, and
the characters in boldface in the last two columns indicate the years in
which discrepancies are observed between the actual and the estimated
region.
A pattern worth remarking is that Brazil started the estimation period
in 1979 with a fairly high IIR, and although its IIR declined thereafter, it
remained quite high until the default and restructuring of 1983. Also, the
gap between Brazil’s actual and its estimated IIR is highest in the runup to
that credit event. According to its actual IIR and external debt ratio, Brazil
was in the relatively safe region II on the eve of its 1983 default, whereas
according to our estimated IIR it belonged in the most debt-intolerant
region (region IV). After the credit event, Brazil remained in the most
debt-intolerant region for a few years by both measures. It is noteworthy
that, whereas the actual IIR was well above the estimated IIR in the years
prior to default, it was below the estimated measure in several of the years
following the initial default (although the gap was not large enough to
generate a discrepancy between the actual and the predicted region). This
pattern is also evident in many other episodes in our sample (not shown)
and lends support to the view that ratings tend to be procyclical.
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Table 8. Predicted Institutional Investor Ratings and Debt Intolerance Regions 
for Argentina and Malaysia
External debt-
to-GDP ratio
(percent) Predicted IIR Regiona Predicted IIR Regiona
0 51.4 I 61.1 I
5 49.3 I 59.0 I
10 47.3 I 57.0 I
15 45.2 III 54.9 I
20 43.2 III 52.9 I
25 41.1 III 50.8 I
30 39.1 III 48.8 I
35 37.0 III 46.7 II
40 34.9 IV 44.7 IV
45 32.9 IV 42.6 IV
Source: Authors’ calculations based on results of regression 7-1 in table 7.
a. Regions are as deﬁned in ﬁgure 4.
Argentina Malaysia
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 27Graduating from Debt Intolerance: Some Suggestive Evidence
As observed above for Brazil, in some years a country’s actual IIR can
be considerably higher than the estimated rating obtained from our simple
model. On the whole, however, these gaps are neither persistent over time
nor systematic in any one direction. Nonetheless, for some countries we
do observe consistent, persistent, and sizable positive gaps between the
actual and the predicted IIR. One interpretation is that these countries
either have graduated, or are in the process of graduating, from club B. 
To explore the countries in our sample that are plausible graduation
candidates, we calculate the difference between the actual and the pre-
dicted IIR averaged over the years 1992–2000—roughly the second half
of the estimation period. The ﬁve countries with the largest gaps during
28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
Table 9. Brazil: Actual and Predicted Institutional Investor Ratings and Regionsa
Institutional Investor rating Region
Year Actual Predicted Differenceb Actual Predicted
1979 64.9 36.9 27.9 I III
1980 55.4 35.5 19.9 I III
1981 49.3 35.2 14.1 II IV
1982 51.3 34.1 17.2 II IV
1983 42.9 27.9 15.0 IV IV
1984 29.9 27.7 2.2 IV IV
1985 31.3 29.2 2.1 IV IV
1986 33.6 31.7 1.9 IV IV
1987 33.6 31.6 2.0 III III
1988 28.9 33.6 –4.7 III III
1989 28.5 37.8 –9.4 III III
1990 26.9 37.7 –10.8 III III
1991 26.1 36.1 –10.0 III III
1992 27.1 34.7 –7.6 III III
1993 27.8 34.6 –6.9 III III
1994 29.6 36.8 –7.2 III III
1995 34.2 38.9 –4.8 III III
1996 37.1 38.7 –1.6 III III
1997 39.2 38.1 1.0 IV IV
1998 38.4 35.8 2.6 IV IV
1999 37.0 29.5 7.4 III III
2000 41.8 31.4 10.4 III III
2001 42.9 28.6 14.3 III IV
Sources: Institutional Investor, various issues; authors’ calculations using results of regression 7-1 in table 7.
a. Shading indicates years when Brazil was in default or undergoing a restructuring of its external debt; boldface type indicates
years when the actual region differs from the predicted region. Regions are as deﬁned in ﬁgure 4.
b. Details may not sum to totals because of rounding.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 28this period are shown, in descending order, in table 10. Not surprisingly,
Greece and Portugal stand out as the most obvious possible cases of grad-
uation from club B to club A. Far back in third and fourth place are
Malaysia and Thailand (their 1997–98 crises notwithstanding), both of
which have no history of default or high inﬂation. Chile, the most consis-
tently good performer in Latin America, ranks ﬁfth, suggesting that it may
have begun to decouple from its long history of high inﬂation and adverse
credit events. 
Ranking Debt Intolerance within Club B
We have presented evidence supporting the notion that there is a group
of countries whose degree of debt intolerance is indeterminate (club B),
and that the countries in this group range from relatively “safe” countries
(region I) to more precarious countries (regions III and IV) where adverse
credit events become increasingly likely. Table 11 presents, for the four-
teen emerging markets in our core sample, two measures of debt intoler-
ance that allow one to assess the relative degree of debt intolerance along
a continuum: the average ratio of external debt to GNP over 1979–2000
divided by the average IIR, and the average ratio of external debt to
exports divided by the average IIR. Regardless of which of these two
summary measures one chooses, those countries with the weakest credit
histories register the highest levels of debt intolerance. For example, the
group average for the ﬁrst measure is more than twice as high for coun-
tries with a record of past default as for those that have avoided default.
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Table 10. Differences in Actual and Predicted Institutional Investor Ratings for
Potential Graduates from Debt Intolerancea
Actual minus 
Country Predicted region Actual region estimated IIR
Greece IV II 41.1
Portugal IV II 35.3
Thailand IV II 22.4
Malaysia IV II 21.2
Chile IV II 19.8
Memoranda:
Mean of full sample, 1992–2000 6.1
Standard deviation of full sample 12.6
Mean excluding above ﬁve countries 2.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on results of regression 7-1 in table 7.
a. Regions are as deﬁned in ﬁgure 4. Data are averages for 1992–2000.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 29The difference between the two groups is much greater, however, when
one looks at the measure that uses the debt-to-exports ratio as the numer-
ator. These simple summary statistics could therefore be useful to com-
pare the relative degree of debt intolerance across countries (as done
here), and over time for any given country.24
Debt Sustainability and Debt Reversals 
Thus far our analysis has focused on quantifying and explaining exter-
nal debt intolerance. To reiterate, the basic premise is that, because of
debt intolerance, some countries periodically have disproportionate difﬁ-
30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
24. Figure 4 employs the debt-to-GDP ratio as a metric for dividing club B into
regions, but the debt-exports ratio could be used alternatively.
Table 11. Summary Debt Intolerance Measures in Selected Emerging Market
Economies, 1979–2000
External debt-to-GNP ratio  External debt-to-exports ratio 
divided by Institutional divided by Institutional
Country Investor rating Investor rating


















Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Institutional Investor, various issues, and World Bank, Global Development
Finance, various issues.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 30culty repaying their debts on the original terms, even at levels of indebt-
edness that would be considered moderate for countries that are not debt
intolerant. Here we ﬁrst discuss the implications of debt intolerance for
standard debt sustainability analyses, and then turn our attention to what
we call debt reversals—episodes during which countries have managed to
signiﬁcantly reduce their external debt relative to GNP. The latter analy-
sis will show that debt-intolerant countries very rarely achieve signiﬁcant
reductions in their debt burden solely through sustained growth or lower
interest rates, but instead require some kind of adverse credit event
(default or restructuring) to reduce their debt. In addition, the analysis
will show that, following such an event, governments in emerging market
countries often quickly amass debt once again, and the symptoms of debt
intolerance reemerge, often leading to serial default. This evidence will
uncover some critical shortcomings of standard sustainability exercises.
Implications of Debt Intolerance for Debt Sustainability Analysis
How does one square our proposed measures of debt intolerance and,
more broadly, the existence of debt intolerance with standard approaches
to assessing debt sustainability as practiced in both the public and the
private sector? Standard debt sustainability analysis, as applied to a coun-
try’s external debt, works off the following simple accounting relationship:
where D(t) is a country’s external debt at time t, TB is its trade balance,
and r is the interest rate paid by the country on its external debt. Simple
manipulation leads to the following steady-state expression:
where TB/Y is the steady-state ratio of the trade balance to output needed
to stabilize the external debt ratio at D/Y, and g is the growth rate of out-
put. (A similar calculus applies to calculating sustainable paths for total
government debt.) It is well recognized that standard debt sustainability
analysis tends to be overly sanguine, in that it does not sufﬁciently allow
for the kinds of real-world shocks that emerging market economies face
(including conﬁdence shocks, political shocks, terms-of-trade shocks,
() / (– )( / ), 2 TB Y r g D Y =
() ( ) [ () ] ()– () , 11 1 Dt rt Dt T Bt +=+
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1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 31and, not least, shocks to returns in industrial countries). Efforts have
therefore been made to ﬁnd ways to “stress-test” these sustainability
calculations.25
Such efforts are useful, but our analysis of debt intolerance suggests
that it is also crucial to take other factors into account. First, it is neces-
sary to recognize that the interest rate a country must pay on its debt is an
endogenous variable, which depends, among other things, on the coun-
try’s debt-to-output (or debt-to-exports) ratio. Because the interest rate on
debt to private creditors can rise very sharply with the level of debt (the
rate charged by official creditors, such as the international financial insti-
tutions, typically does not change), a trajectory that may seem margin-
ally sustainable according to standard calculations may in fact be much
more problematic when debt intolerance is taken into account (not an
uncommon situation, to say the least). This is particularly likely in situa-
tions where a country’s debt-to-GNP ratio is initially projected to rise in
the near future, and only later projected to fall (again, a very common
situation). 
Second, sustainability analyses need to take into account that a coun-
try’s initial level of debt (scaled by output or exports) may already
exceed, or be close to exceeding, what history suggests is that country’s
tolerable debt burden. In cases where the initial level of debt or the initial
rise in D/Y takes a club B country into a region of extreme debt intoler-
ance (that is, into region IV), conventional sustainability analyses are not
likely to be meaningful or useful. Once a country is in the “risk of default”
region identiﬁed in sovereign debt models and approximated by our ear-
lier analysis,26 there is a risk of both dramatically higher interest rates and
a sudden loss of access to market ﬁnancing. And, as we will see below,
the probability that a “virtuous cycle” of falling interest rates and rapid
growth will take the country’s debt burden back to a safe region is, unfor-
tunately, typically low.
32 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
25. See International Monetary Fund (2002) for a recent discussion of these
approaches. As noted, the approaches sometimes focus on total government debt rather
than total external debt, but the issues raised here are similar for both. See Williamson
(2002) and Goldstein (2003) for recent applications of the standard framework to the case
of Brazil.
26. Such models include those of Obstfeld (1994), Velasco (1996), Morris and Shin
(forthcoming), and Jahjah and Montiel (2003).
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To identify episodes of large debt reversals for middle- and low-
income countries over the period 1970–2000, we select all episodes
where the ratio of external debt to GNP fell 25 percentage points or more
within any three-year period, and then ascertain whether the decline in
this ratio was caused by a fall in the numerator, a rise in the denominator,
or some combination of the two.27 To exclude cases where the decline in
the ratio was primarily driven by changes in the nominal value of dollar
GNP, we consider only those episodes where either the decline in the dol-
lar value of external debt was 10 percent or more over the three-year win-
dow, or average growth in the three-year period was 5 percent a year or
higher. This two-stage approach allows us to identify the proximate
causes of the debt reversal. If it is a decline in debt, it may be due to either
repayment or some type of reduction in the present value of debt (that is,
a restructuring); alternatively, if the decline was due primarily (or solely)
to growth, it suggests that the country grew out of its debt. 
We conducted the exercise for both low- and middle-income developing
economies. The algorithm yielded a total of ﬁfty-three debt reversal episodes
for the period 1970–2000, twenty-six of which occurred in middle-income
countries and the rest in low-income countries.
The Debt Reversal Episodes
Table 12 lists those debt reversal episodes that occurred in middle-
income developing countries with populations of at least 1 million, sepa-
rating those cases that involved an adverse credit event (a default or a
restructuring) from those that did not.28 Of the twenty-two debt reversals
identiﬁed, ﬁfteen coincided with some type of default or restructuring of
external debt obligations. In ﬁve of the seven episodes that did not coin-
cide with a credit event, the debt reversal was primarily effected through
net debt repayments; in only one of these episodes (Swaziland in 1985)
did the debt ratio decline strictly because the country grew out of its debt.
However, growth was also the principal factor explaining the decline in
the debt ratio in four of the ﬁfteen credit event cases (Chile, Morocco,
Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano 33
27. Our basic results appear reasonably robust to our choice of “windows” of 25 per-
cent decline and three years—see the analysis of Brady plan countries below, however.
28. A similar table summarizing the debt reversals of the low-income countries is
available from the authors upon request.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 34Panama, and the Philippines) and a lesser factor in seven of those epi-
sodes, as well as in four episodes that did not coincide with a credit event.
Overall, this exercise shows that growth alone is typically not sufﬁcient to
allow countries to substantially reduce their debt burden—yet another
reason to be skeptical of overly sanguine standard sustainability calcula-
tions for debt-intolerant countries.
Of those cases involving credit events, Russia and Egypt obtained by
far the largest reductions in their nominal debt burden in their restructur-
ing deals: $14 billion and $11 billion, respectively. Two countries
involved in the 1997–98 Asian crisis—Thailand and Korea—engineered
the largest debt repayments among those episodes where a credit event
was avoided.
Conspicuously absent from the large debt reversal episodes shown in
table 12 are the well-known Brady restructuring deals of the 1990s.
Although our algorithm does place Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Jordan, Nigeria,
and Vietnam in the debt reversal category, larger countries such as Brazil,
Mexico, and Poland do not register. The reasons for this apparent puzzle
are examined below.
The Missing Brady Bunch: Episodes of Rapid Releveraging
Table 13 traces the evolution of external debt in the seventeen develop-
ing countries whose external obligations were restructured under the
umbrella of the Brady Plan deals pioneered by Mexico and Costa Rica in
the late 1980s.29 It is clear from the table why our debt reversal algorithm
failed to pick up twelve of these seventeen countries. In ten of those twelve
cases, the reason is that the decline in the external debt-to-GNP ratio pro-
duced by the Brady restructuring was less than 25 percentage points. But
this is only part of the story. Argentina, Nigeria, and Peru had higher debt-
to-GNP ratios just three years after their Brady deals than in the year
before the restructuring. Moreover, by the end of 2000, seven of the seven-
teen countries that had undertaken a Brady-type restructuring (Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and Uruguay) had ratios of
external debt to GNP that were higher than they were three years after the
Brady deal, and four of those countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Peru) had higher debt ratios by the end of 2000 than just before the Brady
Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano 35
29. For details on the Brady debt restructurings of the 1990s, see Cline (1995) and
International Monetary Fund (1995). For a survey of the debate prior to the Brady Plan see
Williamson (1988).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 36deal. By 2002 three members of the Brady bunch had once again defaulted
on their external debt (Argentina, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ecuador), and a few
others were teetering on the brink. The evidence clearly suggests that,
when assessing debt restructuring programs for highly debt-intolerant
countries, it is critical to ask whether measures can be taken to reduce the
likelihood of the problem remerging in the near term. 
Domestic Debt, Dollarization, and Liberalization
Up to this point, our analysis of debt intolerance has focused on a
country’s total external debt. The reasons for this are twofold. First, until
recently, the theoretical literature on public debt in emerging market
economies focused primarily on external debt rather than on total govern-
ment debt. This common practice was grounded in the observation that
governments in most emerging markets had little scope for ﬁnancing their
ﬁscal deﬁcits by resorting to the domestic placement of marketable debt.
Second, a key point of our empirical analysis has been to show that the
external debt burdens that countries are able, and have been able, to toler-
ate are systematically related to their own credit and inﬂation histories.
We have investigated this proposition using time series for countries’
level of external indebtedness dating back to the 1970s. Unfortunately,
there is not a sufﬁcient past record to allow a comparable empirical analy-
sis of domestic government debt. That said, an early read of the available
evidence suggests that a history of external debt intolerance is probably a
good predictor of domestic debt intolerance today.
Domestically issued, market-based government debt has become
increasingly important for emerging market economies, both as a source
of government ﬁnancing and as a trigger for generalized debt and ﬁnan-
cial crises. Domestically issued foreign currency debt (the infamous
tesobonos) was at the center of the Mexican crisis of December 1994.
Such debt also contributed to the costly collapse of the convertibility
regime in Argentina in late 2001. And that debt presently accounts for the
lion’s share of public debt in Brazil and Turkey and will ultimately deter-
mine the fate of those countries’ efforts at ﬁnancial stabilization. Argen-
tina, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, of course, all exhibit high external debt
intolerance by our historical measures. 
Recognizing this fact, in this section we discuss some conceptual
issues related to the role of domestic government debt in emerging market
Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano 37
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 37economies, and we document and explain some related manifestations of
debt intolerance—such as dollarization—and offer some explanations for
the rapid growth of domestic government debt in recent years. The growth
of such debt turns out to be a widespread phenomenon in these econo-
mies. We conjecture that, in the future, the same historical factors that
explain external debt intolerance will extend to domestic debt intolerance,
as will the conclusions we have drawn about how rare it is for countries to
grow their way out of heavy indebtedness.
There is no easy way to aggregate domestically issued and externally
issued government debt for the purpose of assessing ﬁnancial vulner-
ability or the likelihood of a debt crisis, and views differ on how to do
so.30 To be sure, the view that external debt is completely separable from
domestically issued debt is dead wrong. As a by-product of capital mobil-
ity and ﬁnancial integration, foreigners hold increasingly large amounts
of the domestically issued debt of governments of emerging markets, and
their residents increasingly hold instruments issued by governments in
advanced economies. Financial integration and open capital accounts
encourage active arbitrage across the two markets. In such a setting, a
default on domestic government debt can easily trigger a default on for-
eign debt, ﬁrst for reputational reasons, and second because induced out-
put and exchange rate effects can easily affect a country’s prospects for
servicing its foreign debt, not least through the havoc that domestic
default wreaks on the banking system. 
That said, it is also clearly wrong to assume that domestically issued
and foreign-issued debt are perfect substitutes. First, foreigners typically
do hold a large share of externally issued debt, whereas domestic resi-
dents typically hold most domestically issued debt. Second, the risks of a
cutoff of international trade credits and the risks to future international
borrowing are undeniably greater following a default on foreign-issued
debt. Thus the default calculus simply cannot be the same for the two
classes of debt instruments, and they will not, in general, be equivalent.
(The fundamental distinction between them is clearly reﬂected in the fact
that, at times, rating agencies give the sovereign foreign-issued debt of a
country a signiﬁcantly higher grade than its domestically issued debt.) 
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
30. The recent IMF study on debt sustainability, for example, proposes to undertake
parallel assessments of external and public (domestic and external) debt burdens (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2002).
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issued and domestically issued government debt, our objective in this sec-
tion is to present some basic facts and explore whether the symptoms of
debt intolerance seem broadly similar for both types of instrument. We
leave it to future research to delineate more clearly the dividing lines
between domestic and external debt in a global economy.
The Growth of Domestic Government Debt: New Data
Figure 5 illustrates the rapid growth of marketable domestic govern-
ment debt in emerging market economies in the late 1990s. By the end of
2001, the stock of domestic government debt of the twenty-four countries
represented in the ﬁgure amounted to approximately $800 billion. More
than 25 percent of that stock consisted of debt linked to a foreign cur-
rency, and the bulk of the rest was often indexed to some other market
variable (for example, as of the end of 2002, about 45 percent of Brazil’s
domestic government debt was linked to the overnight interest rate). The
fraction of domestic government debt that is not indexed to a market vari-
able is typically of very short maturity. Indeed, the successful issuance of
nonindexed domestic currency bonds for long-term ﬁnancing remains as
elusive today for the majority of emerging market economies as it was
two or three decades ago. 
These trends suggest that domestic debt intolerance can manifest itself
in a manner similar to external debt intolerance. Indeed, as we will later
show for dollarization, many of the variables typically linked to the vul-
nerability of a country’s debt position (maturity structure, indexation, and
the like) are manifestations of debt intolerance and may be viewed as
linked to a common set of factors.
The surge in domestic government debt is also apparent in the emerg-
ing market economies that formed the core sample of our analysis of
external debt intolerance. Table 14 shows that the stock of domestic gov-
ernment debt in this group of countries has increased markedly over the
last two decades. The rise has been particularly large in the Asian coun-
tries—both in those with no default history and in the Philippines, which
has defaulted only once in its modern history. But domestic government
debt has also risen signiﬁcantly in a number of Latin American countries,
as well as in Turkey.
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buildup of domestic government debt was propelled by the recapitaliza-
tion of domestic ﬁnancial systems that governments engineered in the
aftermath of the 1997–98 crisis. Financial system bailouts also con-
tributed to the rise of domestic government debt in Mexico and Turkey. In
the other cases, including India, the buildup of domestic public debt has
primarily reﬂected  ﬁscal proﬂigacy. More precisely, as we will show
later, governments’ inability (or unwillingness) to offset the revenue
losses stemming from trade and ﬁnancial reform, and from disinﬂation,
with new taxes or lower spending sets them up for a fall.
Regardless of its origins, and notwithstanding the positive effects that
government debt may have for domestic ﬁnancial markets, the rise of
domestic public debt in many emerging market economies arguably over-
shadows the progress that many of them have made in containing their
external debt burden, raising complex questions about their ability to
overcome longstanding debt intolerance. Barring a relatively rapid over-
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
Figure 5. Domestically Issued Government Debt in Emerging Market Economies,
1996–2001a
Source: IMF staff estimates.
a. The value of domestic debt denominated in local currency is measured in dollars at the end-of-period exchange rate. The
twenty-four countries used to construct this ﬁgure are: Kazakhstan, Mexico, Ukraine, Indonesia, Pakistan, Costa Rica, Russia, Bul-
garia, Paraguay, El Salvador, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Egypt, Romania, Lebanon, Turkey, Uruguay, Argentina, Belarus,
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1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 40haul of their tax and legal systems or determined efforts to reduce their
spending, it seems unreasonable to expect that the governments of all
these countries will refrain from doing to their domestically issued debt
what so many of them in the past have done so often to their external
obligations. Indeed, table 14 suggests that a wave of restructuring or out-
right default on domestic government debts looms large on the horizon
for many emerging market economies in the early part of the twenty-ﬁrst
century.
Dollarization as a Manifestation of Debt Intolerance
The external debts of emerging market economies are, almost without
exception, denominated in foreign currency. As discussed in the preced-
ing section, however, governments in many emerging markets today also
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Table 14. Domestic and External Government Debt in Selected Emerging Market
Economies, 1980s and 1990s
Percent of GDP
Early 1980sa Late 1990sb
Country Domesticc Externald Total Domesticc Externald Total
Countries with at least one external default or restructuring since 1824
Argentina 13.2 38.4 51.6 15.4 36.4 51.8
Brazil 15.9 31.4 47.3 35.8 18.5 54.3
Chile 10.8 45.9 56.7 27.3 8.8 36.1
Colombia 4.4 25.8 30.2 12.4 24.5 36.9
Mexico 2.3 37.7 40.0 9.5 26.8 36.3
Philippines 13.6 60.3 73.9 43.0 48.8 91.8
Turkey 12.9 28.8 41.7 24.4 36.5 60.9
Venezuela 11.6 38.5 50.1 7.4 32.6 40.0
Average 10.6 38.4 48.9 21.9 29.1 51.0
Countries with no history of external default
India 7.1 12.3 19.4 64.9 20.6 85.5
Korea 9.4 41.9 51.3 41.6 21.1 62.7
Malaysia 20.8 39.0 59.8 35.1 30.7 65.8
Thailand 6.1 25.2 31.3 34.6 41.5 76.1
Average 10.9 29.6 40.5 44.1 28.5 72.5
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics, various issues; World Economic Outlook, various
issues; World Bank, Debt Tables and Global Development Finance, various issues; IMF staff estimates; national sources.
a. Average for 1980–85, except for domestic debt in Argentina (1981–86), Brazil (1981–85), Mexico (1982–85), and Turkey
(1981–86).
b. Average for 1996–2000, except for domestic debt in Korea (1997–2000).
c. Data for the 1980s are for general-government debt in all countries except Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, for which
coverage of the public sector is broader. Data for the 1990s are for nonﬁnancial public sector debt.
d. External debt of the nonﬁnancial public sector.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 41issue domestic debt linked to a foreign currency. Even more countries,
including many that have experienced very high or chronic inﬂation, have
highly dollarized banking systems. Table 15 provides a few summary
indicators of the degree of domestic dollarization in the emerging market
economies in our core sample for the period 1996–2001. The last column
of the table reports the average value for the period of a composite dollar-
ization index, which ranges from zero when there is no domestic dollar-
ization of any form to a maximum of 20 when the domestic ﬁnancial
system is highly dollarized.31
The table shows considerable variation in the degree of domestic dol-
larization among countries with a history of default, with Argentina scor-
ing very high on the index but Colombia and Venezuela very low. On the
whole, however, countries with a patchier credit history have more
domestic dollarization on any of these measures than do countries with no
default history. Thus, for example, according to the composite index,
countries with a history of external debt default are about four times more
dollarized than the most dollarized nondefaulting country (Malaysia). The
likely reason is that, by and large, debt-intolerant countries tend to have a
history of high (and often chronic) inﬂation.
We performed a cross-country regression of the domestic dollarization
index shown in table 15 against the same independent variables used in
the previous section to explain countries’ average Institutional Investor
ratings (that is, their long-run creditworthiness), namely, credit and inﬂa-
tion histories and debt-to-output ratios. The results are as follows:
Indexi = 0.04 – 2.30X1 + 0.08X2 + 0.05X3 + 0.04X4
(0.03) (1.59) (2.67) (1.67) (2.00)
Adjusted R2 = 0.31; N = 62 (t statistics in parentheses).
In this regression, X1 is an intercept dummy for club A countries; X2 is the
percentage of twelve-month periods since 1948 when inﬂation in country
i was at least 40 percent; X3 is the percentage of years since 1824 during
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
31. The composite index consists of the sum of the ratio of foreign currency deposits to
broad money and the ratio of foreign currency–denominated domestic government debt to
total domestic debt (both ratios normalized to indexes ranging from 0 to 10; see Reinhart,
Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) for details.
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external debt-to-GNP ratio. Considering that dollarization is a form of
indexation, it is not surprising that a country’s inﬂation history is the most
important variable in explaining it. The external debt-to-GNP ratio is also
signiﬁcant and has a positive coefﬁcient. Although the interpretation of
the role of external debt is less obvious, a reasonable conjecture is that,
when the external debt burden is high, governments are more likely to
resort to inﬂationary  ﬁnancing of their ﬁscal imbalances and, in the
process, to suffocate the development of a market for nominal govern-
ment debt in domestic currency. Indeed, this has clearly happened in
many of the highly dollarized economies. 
Liberalization, Stabilization, and Its Consequences for Debt
Many factors contributed to the alarming rise in domestic government
debt reported in table 14. Key among these have been the revenue losses
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Table 15. Measures of Domestic Dollarization in Selected Emerging Market
Economies, 1996–2001
Share of domestic
Ratio of foreign   government debt 
currency deposits to denominated in foreign Composite domestic
Country broad money (percent) currency (percent) dollarization indexa
Countries with at least one default or restructuring since 1824
Argentina 52.5 81.8 15
Brazil 0.0 19.9 2
Chile 8.3 8.4 2
Colombia 0.0 6.7 1
Egypt 26.0 5.7 4
Mexico 5.5 0.0 2
Philippines 27.6 0.0 3
Turkey 45.9 21.9 8
Venezuela 0.1 0.0 1
Average 18.4 16.0 4.2
Countries with no default history 
India 0.0 0.0 0
Korea 0.0 0.0 0
Malaysia 1.8 1.7 1
Singapore 0.0 0.0 0
Thailand 0.8 0.0 0
Average 0.5 0.3 0.2
Source: Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) and sources cited therein.
a. Index ranges from 0 to 20, where 20 is the most dollarized.
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since the late 1980s. The last column of table 16 shows that trade liberal-
ization typically entailed revenue losses for the emerging markets in our
core sample. A similar pattern is discernible in ﬁgure 6. The left-hand
panels show a steady decline in trade tax revenue as a share of GDP in
four countries from our core sample during that period. In some cases this
revenue loss was offset by higher revenue from other sources (such as
value added taxes). However, the estimates in table 16 show that, for the
group as a whole, total tax revenue as a share of GDP also experienced a
cumulative decline over the last two decades. 
Declining trade taxes were not the only cause of erosion of the tradi-
tional sources of revenue in emerging market economies. In the wake of
ﬁnancial liberalization, revenue from ﬁnancial repression also vanished,
as table 17 shows. Interest rate ceilings were lifted, and bank loans to the
government at subsidized interest rates gave way to market-based domes-
tic public debt at high interest rates. As presciently noted by Ronald
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
Table 16. Changes in Government Revenue and Expenditure in Selected Emerging
Market Economies, 1980–2000a
Percent of GDP
1980–85 to  1986–90 to  1990–95 to  1980–85 to 
Item 1986–90 1991–95 1996–2000 1996–2000
Countries with at least one default or restructuring since 1824b
Total expenditure –1.0 –0.7 0.4 –1.3
Interest payments 3.4 –1.1 –0.5 1.8
Total revenue –2.9 1.7 0.0 –1.2
Tax revenue –2.0 1.0 0.5 –0.5
Trade taxes –0.3 –0.2 –0.4 –0.9
Government balance 2.4 –2.3 0.5 0.6
Seigniorage revenue –0.8 –0.3 –1.2 –2.3
Countries with no default historyc
Total expenditure –1.2 –2.7 0.5 –3.4
Interest payments 0.8 –1.2 –0.6 –1.0
Total revenue 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.7
Tax revenue –1.2 0.8 –0.7 –1.1
Trade taxes –0.5 –0.6 –0.5 –1.6
Government balance –1.8 –3.2 0.0 –5.0
Seigniorage revenue 0.5 0.3 –0.8 0.0
Source: Appendix table D5.
a. Data are simple averages of the countries in each group.
b. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela.
c. India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 46McKinnon in the early 1990s (see footnote 5), the outcome was often a
signiﬁcant increase in domestic interest outlays by the government, a
trend that is clearly captured in the right-hand panels of ﬁgure 6 and in
table 16 (for countries with a history of default). Simply put, much of the
debt that governments had long crammed down the throats of ﬁnancial
intermediaries at below-market interest rates suddenly became part of
those governments’ market debt burden. Debt intolerance symptoms rose
accordingly.
In addition to revenue losses and higher debt servicing costs, many of
the emerging market economies in our core sample—particularly the
group with a default history—had traditionally relied on revenue from
seigniorage to ﬁnance a nontrivial fraction of their ﬁscal deﬁcits. As those
countries succeeded in reducing inﬂation, revenue from seigniorage
became much less important. As table 16 shows, the cumulative decline
was over 2 percent of GDP, and for some countries (such as Argentina
Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano 47
Table 17. Revenue from Financial Repression in Selected Emerging Market
Economies, Early 1980s and Late 1990s
Percent of GDP
Early 1980sa Late 1990sb
Country Measure 1c Measure 2d Measure 3e Measure 2d Measure 3e
Countries with at least one default or restructuring since 1824
Argentina n.a. 0.0 2.1 –0.6 –1.6
Brazil 0.5 n.a. n.a. –4.5 –3.6
Chile n.a. 0.4 –1.6 –1.7 –1.7
Colombia 0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.6 –0.7
Mexico 5.8 2.0 1.5 –0.4 –0.2
Philippines 0.8 n.a. n.a. –2.7 –0.8
Turkey 2.7 n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.5
Countries with no history of external default
Thailand 0.8 –0.6 –2.5 –1.4 –2.1
India 2.9 n.a. n.a. –0.6 –0.5
Korea 0.6 n.a. n.a. –1.9 –2.1
Malaysia 1.0 n.a. n.a. –0.7 –2.3
Sources: Giovannini and de Melo (1993), Easterly (1989), and Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), and authors’ calculations.
a. Average for 1980–85, except for Giovannini and de Melo (1993) estimates for Brazil (1983–87), Malaysia (1979–81), and
Mexico (1984–87).
b. Average for 1996–2000, except for Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia, where averages are for 1997–2000.
c. Estimates from measure proposed by Giovannini and de Melo (1993). Revenue is calculated as the difference between the
foreign and the domestic effective interest rate times the ratio of domestic government debt to GDP.
d. Estimates from measure proposed by Easterly (1989). Revenue is calculated as the negative of the domestic real interest rate
times the ratio of government domestic debt (in domestic currency) to GDP.
e. Estimates from measure proposed by Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994). Revenue is calculated as the difference between
the average real interest rate in OECD countries and the domestic real interest rate, times the ratio of bank deposits in domestic
currency to GDP.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 47and Egypt, as shown in the middle panels of ﬁgure 6) the decline was
even greater. All in all, for those governments that did not manage to
bring expenditure in line with the new realities, one outcome of liberal-
ization and inﬂation stabilization has been a heavier reliance on domestic
or foreign debt ﬁnancing, or both.
Reﬂections on Policies for Debt-Intolerant Countries
The sad fact that our analysis reveals is that once a country slips into
being a serial defaulter, it retains a high level of debt intolerance that is
difﬁcult to shed. Countries can and do graduate to greater creditworthi-
ness, but the process is seldom fast or easy. Absent the pull of an outside
political anchor, such as the European Union or, one hopes, the North
American Free Trade Agreement for Mexico, recovery may take decades
or even centuries. The implications are certainly sobering for sustainabil-
ity exercises that ignore debt intolerance, and even for debt restructuring
plans that pretend to cure the problem permanently, simply through a one-
time reduction in the face value of a country’s debt. 
How serious are the consequences of debt intolerance? Is a country
with weak internal structures that make it intolerant to debt doomed to
follow a trajectory of slower growth and higher macroeconomic volatil-
ity? At some level, the answer has to be yes, but constrained access to
international capital markets is best viewed as a symptom, not a cause, of
the disease. 
Rather, the institutional failings that make a country intolerant to debt
pose the real impediment. The basic problem is threefold. First, the mod-
ern empirical growth literature increasingly points to “soft” factors, such
as institutions, corruption, and governance, as far more important than
differences in capital-labor ratios in explaining cross-country differences
in income per capita. Simply equalizing the marginal product of physical
capital across countries (the sine qua non of capital market integration in
a deterministic world) only goes a limited way toward equalizing mar-
ginal labor products.32 Second, quantitative methods have similarly sug-
gested that the risk-sharing beneﬁts of capital market integration (that is,
the lowering of consumption volatility as opposed to the acceleration of
48 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
32. For a broader discussion, see International Monetary Fund, World Economic Out-
look, April 2003, chapter 3.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 48consumption growth) may also be relatively modest. Moreover, these
results pertain to an idealized world where one does not have to worry
about gratuitous, policy-induced macroeconomic instability, poor domes-
tic bank regulation, corruption, and (not least) policies that distort capital
inﬂows toward short-term debt.33 Third, there is evidence to suggest that
capital ﬂows to emerging markets are markedly procyclical, and that this
may make macroeconomic policies in these countries procyclical as well,
as, for instance, when capital outﬂows force a tightening of ﬁscal policy
and the raising of interest rates.34 Arguably, more limited, but also more
stable, access to capital markets may do more to improve welfare than the
boom-bust pattern so often observed in the past. The deeply entrenched
idea that an emerging market economy’s growth trajectory will be ham-
pered by limited access to debt markets is no longer as compelling as was
once thought. 
The modern empirical growth literature does not actually paint sharp
distinctions between different types of capital ﬂows, whether it be debt
versus equity, portfolio versus direct investment, or long-term versus
short-term. Practical policymakers, of course, are justiﬁably quite con-
cerned with the form that cross-border ﬂows take. For example, foreign
direct investment (FDI) is generally thought to have properties that make
it preferable to debt: it is less volatile, it is often associated with technol-
ogy transfer, and so on.35 We generally share the view that FDI and other
forms of equity investment are somewhat less problematic than debt, but
one wants to avoid overstating the case. In practice, the three main types
of capital inﬂows—FDI, portfolio equity, and loans—are often inter-
linked: for example, foreign ﬁrms often bring cash into a country in
advance of building or acquiring plant facilities. Moreover, derivative
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33. Prasad and others (2003) ﬁnd that, during the 1990s, economies whose ﬁnancial
sectors were de facto relatively open experienced, on average, a rise in consumption
volatility relative to output volatility, contrary to the premise that capital market integration
spreads country-speciﬁc output risk. The same authors also argue that the cross-country
empirical evidence on the effects of capital market integration on growth shows only weak
positive effects at best, and arguably none.
34. See Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2003) on this issue.
35. Of course, it was not always so. Before the 1980s, many governments viewed
allowing FDI as equivalent to mortgaging their countries’ future, and therefore they pre-
ferred borrowing in order to retain full ownership of the country’s assets. And, of course,
where FDI was more dominant (for example, in investment in oil and other natural
resources in the 1950s and 1960s), pressure for nationalization increased. Thus FDI should
not be regarded as a panacea for poor growth performance.
1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 49contracts often blur the three categories, and even the most diligent statis-
tical authorities can ﬁnd it hard to distinguish accurately among different
types of foreign capital inﬂows (not to mention that, when in doubt, some
countries prefer to label a given investment as FDI, to lower their appar-
ent vulnerability). Even with these qualiﬁcations, however, we believe
that governments in advanced economies can do more to discourage
emerging market economies from excessive dependence on risky nonin-
dexed debt relative to other forms of capital ﬂows.36
Lastly, short-term debt, although typically identiﬁed as the main cul-
prit in precipitating debt crises, also helps facilitate trade in goods and is
necessary in some measure to allow private agents to execute hedging
strategies. Of course, one would imagine that most of the essential bene-
ﬁts to having access to capital markets could be enjoyed with relatively
modest debt-to-GNP ratios.
All in all, debt intolerance need not be fatal to growth and macro-
economic stability. However, the evidence presented here suggests that,
to overcome debt intolerance, policymakers need to be prepared to keep
debt levels—especially government debt levels—low for extended peri-
ods while undertaking more basic structural reforms to ensure that the
country can eventually digest a heavier debt burden. This applies not only
to external debt but also to the very immediate and growing problem of
domestic government debt. Policymakers who face tremendous short-
term pressures will still choose to engage in high-risk borrowing, and, at
the right price, markets will let them. But an understanding of the basic
problem, at least, should guide the citizens of such countries, not to men-
tion the international lending institutions and the broader international
community, in making their own decisions.
In our view, developing a better understanding of the problem of serial
default on external debt obligations is essential to designing better domes-
tic and international economic policies aimed at crisis prevention and
resolution. As we have shown, debt intolerance can be captured systemat-
ically by a relatively small number of variables, principally a country’s
own history of default and high inﬂation. Debt-intolerant countries face
surprisingly low thresholds for external borrowing, beyond which the
risks of default or restructuring become signiﬁcant. With the recent explo-
50 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
36. Rogoff (1999) and Bulow and Rogoff (1990) argue that creditor countries’ legal
systems should be amended so that they no longer tilt capital ﬂows toward debt.
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this paper, these thresholds for external debt are now clearly even lower,
although it remains an open question to what extent domestic and external
debt can be aggregated for purposes of analysis. This question needs
urgently to be addressed, in part because many questions involving
bailouts by the international community surround it. Our initial results
suggest that the same factors that determine external debt intolerance (not
to mention other manifestations of debt intolerance, such as dollarization)
are also likely to impinge heavily on domestic debt intolerance. We have
also shown that whereas debt-intolerant countries need badly to ﬁnd ways
to bring their debt-GNP ratios down to safer ground, doing so is not easy.
Historically, those countries that have escaped high external debt-GNP
ratios, through rapid growth or through sizable repayments over many
years, are very much the exception. Most large reductions in the external
debt of emerging markets have instead been achieved primarily through
restructuring or default. The challenge today is to ﬁnd ways other than
still more debt to channel capital to debt-intolerant countries, to prevent
the cycle from repeating itself for yet another century to come.
Conclusions
Cycles in capital ﬂows to emerging market economies have been with
us now for nearly 200 years. Some of the players, both borrowers and
lenders, may change, but the patterns that the cycles follow have
remained quite similar over time. When interest rates are low, when liq-
uidity is ample, and when the prospects for equity markets dim in the
world’s ﬁnancial centers, investors will seek higher returns elsewhere.
During these periods, it is easier for governments in emerging markets to
borrow abroad—and borrow they do. But history has shown that, for
many of these countries, to borrow is to brook default. As the track
record of serial default highlights, many of these booms ended in tears.
The policy challenge for these countries is to address a chronic long-term
problem—their own debt intolerance—rather than take remedial mea-
sures that will allow them to regain the favor of international capital mar-
kets for a few brief months or years.
This paper has taken a ﬁrst step toward making the concept of debt
intolerance operational. We have conjectured that, beyond reputational
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1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 51factors, serial default may owe to a vicious cycle in which default weak-
ens a country’s institutions, in turn making subsequent default more
likely. We have also stressed that safe debt thresholds vary from country
to country and depend importantly on history. Clearly, much more
research is needed to shed light on what other factors—economic, politi-
cal, institutional—ﬁgure in the calculus of what debt levels, external and
domestic, are sustainable and what are the true long-term costs of default.
APPENDIX A
Deﬁnitions
External debt: the total liabilities of a country with foreign creditors,
both ofﬁcial (public) and private. Creditors often determine all the terms
of the debt contracts, which are normally subject to the jurisdiction of the
foreign creditors or (for multilateral credits) to international law.
Total government (or public) debt: the total debt liabilities of a
government with both domestic and foreign creditors, where “govern-
ment” normally comprises the central administration, provincial and
local governments, and all entities that borrow with an explicit govern-
ment guarantee.
Government domestic debt: all debt liabilities of a government that are
issued under—and subject to—national jurisdiction, regardless of the
nationality of the creditor. Terms of the debt contracts may be market
determined or set unilaterally by the government.
Government foreign currency domestic debt: debt liabilities of a gov-
ernment that are issued under national jurisdiction but expressed in (or
linked to) a currency different from the national currency.
APPENDIX B
Sample Description
To illustrate the extent to which modern-day debt intolerance arises
from countries’ own external credit histories (because of persistence in
certain economic and social characteristics as well as reputational fac-
tors), we use throughout the paper a core sample comprising three groups
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1440-01 BPEA/Reinhart  07/17/03  08:11  Page 52of countries: emerging market economies with a history of default or
restructuring of external debt, emerging market economies without a his-
tory of default or restructuring, and advanced economies, which mostly
have no history of default except during wartime (for instance, in the case
of Japan and Italy during World War II). Included in the ﬁrst group are
countries with a history of default or restructuring that involved conces-
sional terms: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Mexico, the
Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela. Both of the other two groups consist
of countries that have no history of external debt default or restructuring,
but we consider it important to distinguish developing from advanced
economies. Emerging market economies with an unblemished credit
record belong to a different debtor “club” from their more advanced coun-
terparts. The core emerging market economies with no history of default
are India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The core sample of
advanced industrial countries consists of Australia, Canada, Italy, New
Zealand, Norway, and the United States. 
Appendix table B1 provides a complete list of the countries used in the
empirical analysis and their individual Institutional Investor ratings aver-
aged across 1979–2002.
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Table B1. Countries in the Sample and Average Institutional Investor Ratings,
1979–2002
Average Institutional  Average Institutional 
Country Investor rating Country Investor rating
Club A: Institutional Investor rating ≥ 67.7 
United States 92.8 Finland 77.2
Japan 92.5 Denmark 76.9
Canada 86.0 Italy 76.4
Norway 84.3 Spain 73.8
Singapore 79.9 Ireland 71.4
Sweden 79.7 New Zealand 70.7
Australia 77.3 Hong Kong 68.0
Club B: Institutional Investor rating between 24.1 and 67.7
Malaysia 63.5 Turkey 34.9
South Korea 63.4 Philippines 34.7
Portugal 63.3 Argentina 34.7
Saudi Arabia 62.8 Morocco 34.6
Thailand 55.7 Jordan 34.0
Greece 54.5 Egypt 33.7
Czech Republic 54.5 Paraguay 32.7
Hungary 50.5 Panama 32.5
Chile 47.5 Poland 32.2
South Africa 46.8 Romania 31.4
India 46.5 Kenya 29.2
Indonesia 46.0 Costa Rica 28.3
Mexico 45.8 Sri Lanka 28.2
Colombia 44.6 Ecuador 27.7
Israel 42.8 Nigeria 26.0
Venezuela 41.5 Peru 25.9
Algeria 39.2 Pakistan 25.7
Ghana 37.6 Swaziland 25.4
Brazil 37.4 Zimbabwe 24.9
Uruguay 37.1 Nepal 24.5
Papua New Guinea 35.5
Club C: Institutional Investor rating ≤ 24.1 
Dominican Republic 22.7 Mali 16.6
Jamaica 21.5 Tanzania 14.7
Bolivia 19.0 Ethiopia 11.5
El Salvador 18.0
Source: Institutional Investor, various issues.
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Data Sources
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Table C1. Data Sources
Series Description and sources Sample period
Institutional Investor Institutional Investor, various issues 1979–2002
country credit ratings
Secondary market prices of  Salomon Brothers, Inc.; ANZ Bank  1986–1992
debt Secondary  Market Price Report
EMBI (Emerging Markets  JP Morgan Chase 1992–2002
Bond Index) spread
External debt-to-GNP World Bank, Global Development  1970–2000
ratio Finance
External debt-to-exports  World Bank, Global Development  1970–2000
ratio Finance
Interest payments on  World Bank, Global Development  1970–2000
external debt Finance
General-government debt-to- OECD data 1970–2002
GNP ratio (OECD countries)
General-government OECD  data 1970–2002
debt-to-exports ratio 
(OECD countries)
Domestic government debt International Monetary Fund, Government  1980–1986
Finance Statistics; IMF staff estimates 1996–2001
Probability of inﬂation  International Monetary Fund,  1958–2001
above 40 percent International Financial Statistics; 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002)
Probability of being in  Beim and Calomiris (2001), Standard &  1824–1999
a state of default or Poor’s Credit Week, Standard & Poor’s 
restructuring (1992), Reinhart (2002), authors’ 
calculations
Domestic dollarization index Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) 1996–2001
Ratio of foreign currency  International Monetary Fund,  1996–2001
deposits to broad money International Financial Statistics;  
various central banks
Share of domestic govern- IMF staff estimates 1996–2001
ment debt denominated in 
foreign currency
Ratio of central govern- International Monetary Fund,  1980–2000
ment expenditure to GDP Government Finance Statistics
Ratio of interest  International Monetary Fund,  1980–2000
payments to GDP Government Finance Statistics
Ratio of central govern- International Monetary Fund,  1980–2000
ment revenue to GDP Government Finance Statistics
(continued)
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Table D1. Coefﬁcient on Year Dummy Variable in Panel Regressions, Emerging
Markets Sample, 1979–2000a
Year Coefﬁcient Standard error t Statistic Probability
Debt/GNP –0.13 0.01 –9.93 0.00
1980 –1.59 1.78 –0.90 0.37
1981 –2.31 1.76 –1.31 0.19
1982 –5.17 1.77 –2.92 0.00
1983 –9.39 1.77 –5.32 0.00
1984 –12.60 1.77 –7.11 0.00
1985 –12.32 1.78 –6.91 0.00
1986 –11.91 1.79 –6.65 0.00
1987 –12.23 1.78 –6.84 0.00
1988 –12.74 1.78 –7.15 0.00
1989 –12.69 1.78 –7.12 0.00
1990 –13.17 1.77 –7.46 0.00
1991 –13.19 1.77 –7.47 0.00
1992 –13.48 1.74 –7.76 0.00
1993 –11.78 1.74 –6.79 0.00
1994 –9.97 1.72 –5.79 0.00
1995 –8.53 1.72 –4.97 0.00
1996 –7.85 1.71 –4.58 0.00
1997 –6.56 1.71 –3.83 0.00
1998 –5.94 1.72 –3.45 0.00
1999 –6.64 1.72 –3.86 0.00
2000 –4.26 1.72 –2.48 0.01
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is the country’s Institutional Investor rating.
Table C1. Data Sources (continued)
Series Description and sources Sample period
Ratio of tax revenue to GDP International Monetary Fund,  1980–2000
Government Finance Statistics
Ratio of trade taxes to GDP International Monetary Fund,  1980–2000
Government Finance Statistics
Ratio of seigniorage to GDP International Monetary Fund,  1980–2000
International Financial Statistics;
authors’ calculations.
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Table D2. Country-Speciﬁc Fixed Effects Coefﬁcients in Panel Regressions,
Emerging Markets Sample, 1979–2000
Country Coefﬁcient Country Coefﬁcient
Malaysia 79.18 Jordan 56.38
Portugal 77.24 Panama 51.82
Korea 76.19 Philippines 51.06
Saudi Arabia 72.04 Brazil 50.26
Greece 70.81 Uruguay 50.17
Thailand 70.81 Argentina 49.89
Czech Rep. 68.79 Turkey 48.47
Hungary 65.91 Costa Rica 45.04
Indonesia 64.78 Ghana 48.45
Chile 63.11 Ecuador 48.15
Israel 60.18 Nigeria 47.56
Mexico 59.23 Kenya 47.52
Colombia 58.48 Paraguay 46.42
India 57.89 Sri Lanka 45.64
Venezuela 57.67 Peru 42.20
South Africa 54.86 Romania 41.68
Poland 53.98 Pakistan 40.89
Morocco 52.42 Zimbabwe 40.32
Egypt 51.95
Source: Authors’ regressions.
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Table D3. Coefﬁcient on Year Dummy Variable in Panel Regressions, Full Sample,
1979–2000a
Year Coefﬁcient Standard error t Statistic Probability
Debt/GNP, club A –0.00 0.03 0.20 0.85
Debt/GNP, non-club A –0.10 0.01 –8.79 0.00
1980 –1.76 1.51 –1.17 0.24
1981 –3.10 1.49 –2.08 0.04
1982 –5.96 1.49 –3.99 0.00
1983 –10.10 1.48 –6.81 0.00
1984 –12.77 1.48 –8.64 0.00
1985 –12.60 1.48 –8.49 0.00
1986 –12.16 1.49 –8.16 0.00
1987 –12.59 1.49 –8.47 0.00
1988 –13.02 1.48 –8.77 0.00
1989 –12.91 1.48 –8.74 0.00
1990 –12.98 1.47 –8.83 0.00
1991 –13.08 1.47 –8.92 0.00
1992 –13.10 1.46 –9.00 0.00
1993 –11.60 1.46 –7.95 0.00
1994 –9.76 1.46 –6.71 0.00
1995 –8.47 1.45 –5.83 0.00
1996 –7.70 1.45 –5.31 0.00
1997 –6.41 1.44 –4.46 0.00
1998 –5.72 1.44 –3.96 0.00
1999 –5.92 1.44 –4.10 0.00
2000 –3.32 1.44 –2.30 0.02
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is the country’s Institutional Investor rating.
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Table D4. Country-Speciﬁc Fixed Effects Coefﬁcients in Panel Regressions, Full
Sample, 1979–2000
Country Coefﬁcient Country Coefﬁcient
Japan 101.70 Israel 50.26
United States 101.50 Morocco 50.11
Canada 94.32 Egypt 49.50
Norway 92.29 Brazil 49.26
Singapore 90.87 Philippines 49.15
Denmark 87.48 Panama 49.11
Finland 86.61 Uruguay 48.97
Italy 84.16 Argentina 48.56
Australia 80.68 Turkey 47.36
Ireland 79.56 Ecuador 45.61
Malaysia 77.74 Ghana 45.41
Korea 75.31 Kenya 45.49
Saudi Arabia 72.07 Paraguay 45.37
Portugal 70.16 Nigeria 44.78
Thailand 69.49 Sri Lanka 43.78
Czech Rep. 67.42 Costa Rica 42.86
Hungary 64.11 Romania 41.06
Indonesia 62.98 Peru 40.25
Greece 61.32 Pakistan 39.56
Chile 61.18 Zimbabwe 39.05
Mexico 57.94 Jamaica 38.72
Colombia 57.44 Tanzania 37.83
India 57.29 Bolivia 36.32
Venezuela 56.17 Dominican Rep. 34.12
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Table D5. Changes in Government Revenue and Expenditure in Emerging Market
Economies, 1980–2000
Percent of GDP
1980–85 to  1986–90 to  1990–95 to  1980–85 to 
Item 1986–90 1991–95 1996–2000 1996–2000
Countries with at least one default or restructuring since 1824
Argentina
Total expenditure n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.5
Interest payments –0.5 0.3 1.2 1.1
Total revenue –0.2 3.1 6.7 9.7
Tax revenue 1.2 0.4 0.9 2.5
Trade taxes 0.4 –0.7 –0.1 –0.4
Government balance n.a. n.a. –6.2 –6.2
Seigniorage revenue –0.3 –3.4 –1.1 –4.7
Brazil
Total expenditure 9.7 –0.4 –6.6 2.7
Interest payments 12.7 –3.8 –8.5 0.4
Total revenue 1.4 2.1 –4.0 –0.6
Tax revenue –0.9 0.6 1.6 1.3
Trade taxes –0.3 –0.1 0.2 –0.2
Government balance 8.3 –2.4 –2.6 3.3
Seigniorage revenue 4.1 1.0 –6.7 –1.6
Chile
Total expenditure –7.5 –2.8 –0.1 –10.4
Interest payments 0.9 –0.6 –0.8 –0.6
Total revenue –6.3 –0.9 –1.3 –8.5
Tax revenue –5.1 0.5 –1.2 –5.7
Trade taxes 0.3 –0.1 –0.5 –0.3
Government balance –1.2 –2.0 1.2 –2.0
Seigniorage revenue 0.4 –0.1 –0.7 –0.3
Colombia
Total expenditure n.a. n.a. 4.3 4.3
Interest payments 0.6 0.1 1.2 1.9
Total revenue n.a. n.a. 1.3 1.3
Tax revenue 1.7 1.8 –0.8 2.7
Trade taxes 0.6 –1.2 –0.3 –0.8
Government balance n.a. n.a. 3.0 3.0
Seigniorage revenue 0.5 –0.5 –1.3 –1.3
Egypt
Total expenditure –10.3 1.4 –5.9 –14.8
Interest payments 0.6 3.6 –1.3 2.9
Total revenue –10.7 5.2 –8.2 –13.7
Tax revenue –7.2 3.2 –0.8 –4.8
Trade taxes –3.4 –0.4 0.0 –3.9
Government balance 0.4 –3.8 2.3 –1.1
Seigniorage revenue –6.1 0.0 –0.9 –7.1
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Table D5. Changes in Government Revenue and Expenditure in Emerging Market
Economies, 1980–2000 (continued)
Percent of GDP
1980–85 to  1986–90 to  1990–95 to  1980–85 to 
Item 1986–90 1991–95 1996–2000 1996–2000
Mexico
Total expenditure 1.9 –9.5 –0.2 –7.7
Interest payments 7.9 –10.5 –0.8 –3.4
Total revenue 0.4 –0.6 –1.5 –1.7
Tax revenue 0.1 –1.1 –0.6 –1.6
Trade taxes 0.0 0.2 –0.4 –0.2
Government balance 1.5 –8.9 1.3 –6.1
Seigniorage revenue –3.8 –1.2 0.2 –4.7
Philippines
Total expenditure 4.4 2.1 0.5 6.9
Interest payments 3.9 –0.3 –1.5 2.2
Total revenue 2.7 3.4 –0.9 5.1
Tax revenue 1.5 3.2 0.0 4.7
Trade taxes 0.3 1.6 –1.5 0.4
Government balance 1.7 –1.3 1.4 1.8
Seigniorage revenue –1.7 0.4 –0.3 –1.7
Turkey
Total expenditure n.a. 5.1 10.9 15.9
Interest payments n.a. 0.4 7.4 7.9
Total revenue n.a. 3.2 6.5 9.7
Tax revenue n.a. 1.9 6.0 7.9
Trade taxes n.a. –0.2 –0.3 –0.5
Government balance n.a. 1.9 4.3 6.3
Seigniorage revenue 0.4 –0.4 0.3 0.4
Venezuela
Total expenditure –4.2 –1.1 0.6 –4.6
Interest payments 1.0 0.8 –1.1 0.7
Total revenue –7.8 –1.8 1.1 –8.5
Tax revenue –7.4 –1.4 –0.4 –9.1
Trade taxes –0.6 –0.8 –0.2 –1.6
Government balance 3.6 0.6 –0.5 3.8
Seigniorage revenue –0.3 1.1 –0.2 0.5
Countries with no default history
India
Total expenditure 2.8 –1.4 –0.2 1.2
Interest payments 1.1 0.7 0.3 2.2
Total revenue 1.1 –0.9 –0.5 –0.3
Tax revenue 0.6 –1.3 –0.5 –1.1
Trade taxes 0.9 –0.9 –0.4 –0.4
Government balance 1.7 –0.5 0.4 1.5
Seigniorage revenue 0.3 0.0 –0.8 –0.4
(continued)
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Table D5. Changes in Government Revenue and Expenditure in Emerging Market
Economies, 1980–2000 (continued)
Percent of GDP
1980–85 to  1986–90 to  1990–95 to  1980–85 to 
Item 1986–90 1991–95 1996–2000 1996–2000
Korea
Total expenditure –1.5 0.9 0.9 0.3
Interest payments –0.3 –0.3 –0.1 –0.7
Total revenue –0.6 1.0 2.0 2.4
Tax revenue –0.5 –0.1 0.7 0.0
Trade taxes –0.2 –1.1 0.0 –1.3
Government balance –0.9 –0.1 –1.1 –2.0
Seigniorage revenue 1.3 –0.4 –1.2 –0.3
Malaysia
Total expenditure –6.8 –5.4 –2.8 –15.0
Interest payments 2.2 –2.6 –1.7 –2.1
Total revenue –2.3 0.3 –3.3 –5.2
Tax revenue –4.0 1.7 –0.8 –3.1
Trade taxes –2.4 –0.7 –0.9 –4.0
Government balance –4.6 –5.7 0.5 –9.8
Seigniorage revenue 0.5 1.8 –0.8 1.6
Singapore
Total expenditure 2.6 –7.7 2.2 –2.9
Interest payments 0.6 –2.2 –1.2 –2.8
Total revenue 3.1 0.4 6.3 9.8
Tax revenue –3.6 2.1 –1.2 –2.8
Trade taxes –0.7 –0.3 –0.1 –1.1
Government balance –0.4 –8.2 –4.0 –12.7
Seigniorage revenue 0.0 –0.3 –1.0 –1.3
Thailand
Total expenditure –3.0 0.2 2.4 –0.3
Interest payments 0.4 –1.7 –0.3 –1.6
Total revenue 1.9 1.7 –1.9 1.7
Tax revenue 1.6 1.7 –1.5 1.7
Trade taxes 0.2 –0.3 –1.3 –1.4
Government balance –4.9 –1.5 4.3 –2.1
Seigniorage revenue 0.5 0.1 –0.1 0.5
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics and International
Financial Statistics, various issues.
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Discussion
Christopher A. Sims: We learn from this paper that repeated defaults on
sovereign debt are by no means a new problem, that countries with a his-
tory of repeated default tend to persist in this behavior over long periods,
and that such countries sometimes default with ratios of debt to national
outputor to exports that are low by the standards of advanced countries
with long default-free histories. These are facts well worth bringing out,
and they support the paper’s most important policy implication: that the
difﬁculties defaulting countries have in gaining access to international
credit are not exogenous imperfections in the market, but instead proba-
bly reﬂect in large measure the risks of lending to these countries. Indeed,
the paper suggests by its language, without actually supporting in detail,
the hypothesis that international capital markets are imperfect mainly in
lending too freely to countries with a history of default. 
But the paper merely asserts that debt and serial default involve impor-
tant deadweight losses. It is plausible that, as the paper suggests, default
injures ﬁnancial institutions and drives countries toward inefﬁcient ﬁscal
systems. But these assertions are only plausible, not obvious, and they are
not supported in this paper by any evidence. This leaves it an open ques-
tion whether, in countries with a default history, policymakers and inter-
national agencies should focus directly on reducing, eliminating, or
avoiding debt. Debt and default might instead be regarded merely as
symptoms of underlying problems, and possibly even as responses that
alleviate the effects of these underlying problems. 
If default occurred cleanly, without costs other than the direct costs to
investors who do not receive promised returns and to the borrower who
may face higher future borrowing costs, it would be hard to argue that
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debt a contingent claim, and contingent debt is a useful ﬁnancing tool. In
an earlier paper (which the authors cite),1 I presented a highly stylized
model of such cost-free default that predicts many of the statistical asso-
ciations uncovered in this paper: that poorer countries will default more
often; that default is consistent with fairly prompt renewal of borrowing
and indeed with real debt quickly exceeding predefault levels; that highly
variable inﬂation rates are associated with high default probabilities; that
real debt burdens are seldom reduced rapidly except by sudden defaults or
episodes of inﬂation; and that rich countries will have both higher levels
of real debt relative to GDP and lower probabilities of default. These pre-
dictions emerge as implications of optimal  government behavior in a
model in which governments can make ﬁrm commitments about their
future ﬁscal behavior. 
The logic behind these predictions is that governments whose only
sources of revenue are distorting taxes should use debt to smooth tax
rates, keeping taxes and real debt near constant except in times of ﬁscal
crisis. These ideas were ﬁrst worked out in papers by Robert Barro and by
Robert Lucas and Nancy Stokey.2 Barro showed that if a government can
issue only indexed debt, the expected path of future taxes and debt should
be approximately constant. Lucas and Stokey showed that if debt can be
made contingent on exogenous events, taxes and debt should be approxi-
mately constant. My paper considers debt that is contingent only through
inﬂation and studies the optimal time path of defaults under commitment. 
The model that makes these predictions is not meant as a complete
description of the real world—there are in fact deadweight costs to default
of the kinds listed in this paper. But in order to make policy recommenda-
tions, we need to assess how great the deadweight costs of default are.
This is difﬁcult to sort out, because the wealth redistributions and recog-
nitions of losses that are enforced by default understandably cause wide-
spread anguish and complaint but are not in themselves deadweight
losses. I am prepared to believe, if presented with evidence, that the dead-
weight losses are indeed large. But this paper presents no evidence to this
effect. 
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tends to expand in boom times and then contract, with accompanying
defaults, when the boom tails off. Does this mean that poorer countries
should not borrow in boom times? Not obviously. It appears that they may
be borrowing and ﬁnancing substantial investment when capital is cheap
in world markets, then having to cut back when it becomes more expen-
sive. These countries would certainly be better off with a steadier ﬂow of
capital, but episodic ﬂows of foreign investment may be better than none,
particularly if default frees them from having to make excessive real
transfers to creditors when the ﬂow of new credit slows. 
The authors’ table 12 presents evidence that there have been few
episodes of middle-income countries substantially reducing their debt
over a three-year span, except through some form of default. This is pre-
sented as evidence for how heavy the burden of debt is. But, of course,
this is also exactly the result predicted by the simple theory of optimal tax
smoothing. The paper argues that there is a recognizable class of debt-
intolerant countries, that these countries have a “threshold” ratio of debt
to GNP or to exports above which default becomes likely, and that this
threshold is low by the standards of rich-country borrowers. The evidence
for the existence of such a threshold is not very convincing. The authors’
ﬁgure 1 shows the distributions of debt-to-GNP and debt-to-exports ratios
for developing defaulters and developing nondefaulters. It is clear that
very few defaulters have debt-to-GNP ratios below 15 percent, whereas
quite a few nondefaulters have such low debt ratios. But the upper tails of
the two distributions are quite similarly fat. In other words, there is no
clear threshold ratio of debt to GNP above which there are many more
defaulters than nondefaulters. For the debt-to-exports ratio there is such a
threshold, but it is very high (around 400 percent) and thus captures only
a small fraction of all defaulters. Looking at these distributions does not
suggest the existence of any sharp threshold that separates defaulters from
nondefaulters. Figure 3 yields a somewhat similar conclusion. If we tried
to predict a country’s IIR from its debt ratios, we would do extremely
poorly, unless we concentrated on debt-to-GNP ratios above about 70 per-
cent and debt-to-export ratios above about 400 percent. 
The authors correctly observe that it is not uncommon for developing
countries with a history of default to default at debt ratios that other
countries, even other developing countries, manage to carry without
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to identification of a low critical threshold for debt ratios. 
Thus the paper is valuable in focusing attention on important patterns
in the data on external borrowing and default, but it does not deliver con-
vincing policy conclusions. Instead it opens up research questions. Can
we document that debt and default are not just correlated with but impor-
tantly contribute to weak ﬁscal, ﬁnancial, and political institutions? Are
there large deadweight costs from the reorganization of ﬁnancial arrange-
ments and redistributions of wealth that accompany a default episode? Do
capital markets systematically fail to charge developing countries interest
rates that reﬂect actual default risks? When we have answers to these
questions, we can proceed to make recommendations about whether
reducing debt should be a direct focus of reform. 
John Williamson: In the early days of the debt crisis of the 1980s, my
colleague William Cline repeatedly argued that it was against the interests
of the debtor countries to secure debt relief, because this would blemish
their record as debtors and preclude their returning to the international
capital market.1 Eventually they did achieve a measure of debt relief,
through the Brady Plan. This was soon followed by a resurgence of capi-
tal ﬂows, as this paper by Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano recalls. Many
of us concluded that Cline had been mistaken, because capital markets
have short memories (a plausible conclusion because most of those in the
trade seem to be under thirty). One of the basic messages of this paper is
that Cline’s concerns had far more substance than his critics conceded.
History does matter: a history of default (or of what the authors label
“debt intolerance”) undermines a country’s ability to borrow large sums
on reasonable terms. A market perception of debt intolerance may then
breed a sudden stop of capital inﬂows, which makes large debts intolera-
bly expensive to continue servicing, resulting in a vicious circle.
What is “debt intolerance”? The term suggests that it is a reluctance to
make sacriﬁces to maintain debt service when times are difﬁcult, and the
discussion in the paper is consistent with this. But that is not how the
authors measure debt intolerance; instead they measure it as the ratio of
debt to GNP (or to exports) divided by the country’s sovereign debt rating
from Institutional Investor. This is a measure of how burdensome a coun-
66 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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debt service, not of whether it is willing to do so. The two concepts should
have been kept separate, and then the hypothesis that a history of default
undermines a country’s creditworthiness long into the future could have
been explicitly tested, but in most of the paper this is assumed rather than
investigated. The most notable exception is their table 8, which shows
that Argentina (a frequent defaulter) needs to keep its debt-to-GNP ratio
about 20 percentage points lower than Malaysia (which has a perfect
record of avoiding default and restructuring) in order to achieve any given
Institutional Investor rating. Other ﬁndings could be cited that tend to
support their core idea, but one may nevertheless regret that it was not
presented as a hypothesis to be investigated rather than built into a termi-
nology that suggests that the blame for precipitating “credit events” is
completely one-sided.
The paper argues that countries can be classiﬁed into distinct “clubs,”
as measured by their Institutional Investor ratings. Club A consists pri-
marily of advanced countries that have never defaulted (at least not in
recent history); these countries enjoy continuous access to the interna-
tional capital market. Club C consists of countries that enjoy only spo-
radic access to the international capital market. Club B is an intermediate
group of countries where default risk is nontrivial and self-fulﬁlling runs
are a possible trigger to a crisis. This club is further subdivided into coun-
tries with above- and below-average ratings and with high and low
indebtedness. Ratings are explained by the country’s history of high inﬂa-
tion and of past default and by the level of debt (deﬂated by GNP or
exports). The key ﬁnding is that the coefﬁcient on the level of debt is pos-
itive for club A countries and negative for those in club B. Club B coun-
tries with a default history have low creditworthiness and therefore have
to pay high interest rates for what they borrow, which is not much relative
to what club A countries borrow, but more than developing countries
without a history of default typically choose to borrow. 
Unfortunately, borrowing by the industrial countries is measured by a
different concept of debt than is used for the nonindustrial countries: the
measure for nonindustrial countries is external debt, public and private,
whereas that for industrial countries is external and domestic public sec-
tor debt. The authors make a worthy effort in table 14 to provide data on
internal public sector debt in emerging markets, and they emphasize the
growing importance of this phenomenon and the increasing need to
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lem, as they concede.
Because interest rates are much higher in emerging markets with a his-
tory of default than in industrial countries, and because those interest
spreads widen when their debt situation deteriorates (or, worse, lending
comes to a sudden stop), it is difﬁcult for such countries to avoid default-
ing again when hit by a severe negative shock. Countries in these circum-
stances are caught in a vicious circle. The exit strategy the authors offer is
to borrow less in the ﬁrst place, so that they will become invulnerable to
adverse shocks. This policy recommendation happens to be similar to one
offered in a new book that I co-edited with Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski.2
Indeed, the present authors suggest that the maximum prudent debt-to-
GNP ratio for emerging market economies may be around 35 percent,
quite close to the 30 percent recommended by Daniel Artana, Ricardo
López Murphy, and Fernando Navajas in our book. Nevertheless, my
endorsement of the authors’ recommendation is not meant to condone
their attack on Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza.
I agree that the use of the term “original sin” by Eichengreen and his
coauthors to explain developing countries’ borrowing difﬁculties is silly,
since there is no evidence that these countries would be unable to borrow
in domestic currency if they tried. But their suggestion that the multilat-
eral development banks should restructure the composition of their bal-
ance sheets so as to better match the shocks faced by their borrowers, and
their demonstration that this could be done without taking on additional
risk themselves and while offering attractive assets to the public, are bril-
liant. True, borrowers might abuse the leeway such an innovation would
offer them by increasing their borrowing (as the present authors seem to
assume they would), but they might also use it appropriately to reduce
their risk. The same may be said of the authors’ expressed preference for
equity over debt ﬁnance.
The distinction between countries subject to sudden stops of capital
ﬂows and those that can borrow even in the face of severe negative shocks
is fundamental. It is an issue that I ﬁrst grappled with when I visited Chile
in 1991 to discuss the problems for economic policy posed by an inﬂow
of capital that the authorities judged to be excessive. The Chileans I
talked to were adamant that a steep fall in the price of copper would pro-
68 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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increase in borrowing to ﬁnance a countercyclical policy—a prediction
that proved all too correct in 1998. Given the situation as they perceived
it, we agreed that it made sense to restrain capital inﬂows: hence the
encaje.3 Complete capital account liberalization was for that perhaps-
distant day when the capital markets would treat Chile as a developed
country. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis summarized my advice as “ﬁrst join the
OECD, then liberalize the capital account” (although subsequent
history—ﬁrst in Mexico, then in Korea—showed all too clearly that sim-
ply joining the OECD is not enough). It is important to note that sudden
stops are not conﬁned to countries with a history of default: three of the
ﬁve countries classiﬁed as “Emerging market countries with no external
default history” in the authors’ table 1 suffered from sudden stops in
1997, namely, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.
The most profound question raised by this paper is how countries can
graduate from one club to a higher one, with graduation to club A (where
sudden stops no longer happen) being the really important event. We do
know that Chile and Mexico have attained investment-grade ratings on
their debt in recent years, and it is interesting to see in table 9 that Brazil
had a rating from Institutional Investor very close to that needed for
admission to club A in 1979, before the debt crisis. And of course a lot of
today’s advanced countries defaulted as late as the nineteenth century.
These facts give some reason to hope that default in 1824 does not imply
permanent exclusion from club A. But what is needed to win acceptance
there? Is it the attainment of industrial country living standards (in which
case Singapore ought already to be in the club)? Is it a long track record of
servicing debt, such as can be achieved by restraining borrowing and so
reducing debt vulnerability (which seems to be the approach favored by
Reinhart and colleagues)?4 Is it a network of institutions that will support
continued debt service—such as an efﬁcient tax system to raise the
needed revenue, and pension funds dependent on continued receipt of
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retired? Can perhaps the long process of investment in demonstrating
“debt tolerance” be accelerated by not defaulting when the pressure is on?
If so, one has to be thankful that IMF policy toward Brazil in 2002 was
not guided by the argument of this paper!
General discussion: Mark Gertler drew a parallel between the differ-
ences in leverage ratios observed across countries and the differences in
leverage ratios observed across U.S. ﬁrms. In a given industry, larger and
more mature ﬁrms typically have higher leverage ratios than younger and
smaller ﬁrms, which also exhibit higher default rates. Theories based on
asymmetric information and imperfect contract enforceability provide a
rationale for these outcomes. Furthermore, default rates and leverage are
positively correlated across small ﬁrms, although this relation is endoge-
nous. When hit by a negative shock, small ﬁrms do not default right away
but rather build up debt while trying to smooth production in the presence
of low cash ﬂows. They default only when their capacity to borrow more
is exhausted. 
William Brainard agreed that such endogeneity would be important in
country data, because sovereign debt crises have large effects on coun-
tries’ incomes. Because of this, the importance of the variability of
income for the leverage ratio cannot be inferred using data for the whole
sample, but rather from only those observations that are not subject to this
endogeneity. Brainard also stressed that the paper does not go far enough
in accounting for fundamentals that might help explain when countries
are likely to default. For ﬁrms, one traditionally computes various kinds
of coverage ratios in order to assess the relationship between debt-to-
equity ratios and default rates, taking into account the variance of earn-
ings and other fundamentals. By comparison, measures such as the export
coverage ratio are very crude indicators of a country’s position. Some
countries’ exports may be largely manufactured goods tied to imports of
intermediate materials, whereas for others they may consist mainly of raw
materials. Export coverage ratios should be interpreted quite differently in
these two cases. 
Shang-Jin Wei considered a main message of the paper to be that the
ﬁrst default is very costly, because it increases the cost of future debt,
apparently forever. He noted that this view conﬂicts with the idea that
capital markets have very short memories, a point that Barry Eichengreen
70 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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investors want to forgive past behavior and even look for excuses to do so
after some years have passed since the last crisis. He noted that a change
in government often provides such an excuse and suggested that the coun-
try time series in the paper could be used to investigate this idea. Carol
Graham questioned whether reforms in developing countries are neces-
sarily associated with large revenue losses. Although the authors note that
revenue losses from trade and tariff reforms have increased debt in many
such countries, other reforms, such as the privatization of unproﬁtable
state enterprises, would be expected to increase revenue. She suggested
that analyzing revenue by individual country or by group of countries
might illuminate the effect of different reforms and the net effect of
reform generally. 
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